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ABSTRACT
The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of a 
multi-racial i dia programme on the racial attitudes and ego-identity of 
black and white seven to eight year old children. This study took place 
against the social structure of a segregated South African society. On 
a theoretical level, the study attempted to provide a framework for race 
attitude research from the work of Erikson (1965, 1966, 1968), Piaget 
(1932) and Kohlberg (1966, 1971). The study also utilized this three- 
dimensional theoretical background to investigate a possible relation­
ship between racial attitudes, ego-identity and moral development, The 
experiment was based on Solomon's (1949) four-group before-after design: 
half of two ex'^ ei imental groups (one black group and one white group) 
and half of two control groups (one black group and one white group) 
were pracested, while all eighty children were posttesteu. Selection 
of subjects was based on scores obtained on the Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, 1956). Subjects were tested r the Clark Doll Teat, 
the "Show me" test and the Categories Test. The oulti-recial media 
programme consisted primarily of twelve books showing multi-racial 
contact, translated into Sothe for black subjects. Children were 
exposed to the books for a period of two months.
Three hypotheses were investigated : Firstly, it was hypothesized 
that the racial attitudes of two groups of seven to eight year old 
children would change after a multi-racial media programme; secondly, 
that white children would have more positive self-concepts than black 
children before the multi-racial programme and thirdly, that after the 
intervention programme there would be a change in the ego-identity of 
black children. Results showed that the multi-racial media programme 
was ineffective in changing children's racial attitudes. No differ-
Vence was found between the self-concepts of black and white children, 
nor did the self-concepts of black children change after the inter­
vention programme. u t m s  of Solomon's design, pretesting was found 
to have no effect o r _ utest results. A significant negative cor­
relation was found between racial attitudes and ego-identity. This 
was discussed in terms of the theoretical link postulated between 
racial attitudes, ego-identity and moral development, Weaknesses of 
the multi-racial media programme were examined and suggestions made 
for the creation of specifically South African material for use in 
South African schools. Erikson1s theory of ego-identity was seen to 
provide an historical basis for studies of the child within a changing 
social order. The chief methodological criticism concerned the 
necessity for an adequate oper; i <1 and functional interpretation of 
Erikson's ego-identity concept. The study cor firmed the need for 
continued psychological research into race relation problems in South 
Africa and highlighted the lack of tools available for a tuture 
educational desegregation in South Africa.
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Happiness
Happiness
Is the moving picture 
Which a certain percentage 
Of us failed to see 
Because of bitter experiences 
In this just and right world...
(Fanyana Mokaleng, Staffrider, 1978, 
1(3) p. 46).
CHAPTER I
Introduction
The present study employs an historical perspective to investigate 
theoretically and empirically race attitudes and ego-identity in 
children. The value of such a perspective in psychological researcn 
lies in an examination of the child in toto : the child is not born 
into a vacuum, nor does he progress through society vacuously. His own 
mental and physical growth interacts with a changing society and he 
becomes an active participant in, and influential member of, his environ­
ment. It is also the development of the child that contributes to the 
flux or stasis of a particular societal order. This study will thus rep­
resent the dynamic relationship between the child and his environment 
inherent in an historical perspective, and will juxtapose a theoretical 
examination of the child's cognitive and affective growth with an 
investigation of the society in which such development occurs. The 
interdisciplinary nature of this study represents a growing trend in 
Child Development towards cross-cultural research which, by its very 
nature, examines the role of different societies in aiding the child's 
development.
The theories of Erikson (1965, 1966, 1968), Piaget (1932) and 
Kohlberg (1966, 1971) will be critically examined as they focus directly 
on the interaction between stages of development and changing environments. 
Such an examination should provide the necessary theoretical parallel to 
much research into the development of race attitudes. The latter is 
investigated empirically and an attempt is made to change possible racial 
attitudes in children. The unifying theme underlying the theoretical and 
empirical issues of the study is concern for psychology's tole in race 
relations research, this being an instance of psychology's responsibility 
to society as a whole.
1.1. Psychology and Race : a psycho-history
The history of psychology as a scientific discipline is fraught with 
evidence of psychology's concern with issues of race and race relations.
A history of the development of racial attitudes must therefore take 
into account psychology's role in providing scientific sanction for 
studies which have today been disputed and contradicted. It was 
largely the desire to create a scientific psychology that distracted the 
social scientist from examining the philosophical and ideological assump­
tions underlying the direction of his research; and it is now, in the 
face of increasingly difficult race problems both within and without of 
psychology, that the psychologist must reassess his contribution to the 
study of racial attitudes, its concomitant, racism, and its effect on 
both the people who practice it and the people who receive it. It was 
possibly with this in mind that in 1978 the U.S. National Institute of 
Mental Health pledged to
"support research into racism and mental health with 
particular attention to identification of the del­
eterious psychological consequences of racism for 
the entire population and the development of 
specific interventions designed to reduce racist 
attitudes and behaviours" (U.S. Dept. of health, 
education and welfare; 1978, p. 1).
In America and the United Kingdom, black psychologists have questioned
the basic assumptions of much psychological research in what has been
called the "black backlash1' (Comer, 1970). Milner (1973) sees the
direction of race relations research as hinging on whether the social
psychologist will study mainly the white community or whether his
research in the black community will institute a course of change to
improve the conditions of such communities. In South Africa the
need for research of the latter kind is especially great.
Past studies of race problems have to a certain extent represented
the social reality of a specific class of people - the middle-class
white psychologist. Terminology that has arisen from such studies
such as "disadvantaged child", "the Negro's negative self-esteem", 
have in turn reflected the frame of reference held by psychologists 
for whom the norm is their own social reality. One of the few 
psychologists who urged the recognition of different cultural and 
social patterns, the "wider identity" of the Negro American, is Erik 
Erikson (1966) . In his concern with the development of ego-identity 
in the child, Erikson (1964, 1965, 1966, 1968) continually stresses 
the historical and social relativity of stages of development. He 
has rejected the popularized concept of "identity crisis" ii. favour of 
a broader application of the term which he sees as representing
"something in the psychological core of the revolution 
of the coloured races and nations who seek inner as 
well as outer emancipation from colonial rule and 
from remnants of colonial patterns of thought"
(Erikson; 1966, p. 145).
Erikson offers us a theoretical basis with which to examine not only
the development of ego-identity within the person, but also the
growth cf that black consciousness which now questions traditional
psychological studies concerning black identity and white prejudice.
With colonial expansion came the beginning of slavery in America 
and Africa. MacCrone (1957) traces the development of race relations 
in South Africa from the seventeenth century when Portuguese and Dutch 
tradeis arrived in the Cape. The major factor influencing the direc­
tion of race relations in those early days was religion : only a 
heathen could become a slave; as soon as he was baptized he would 
become a free man. Colour prejudice was firmly established by the 
end of the eighteenth century. The laager mentality of frontier 
society was responsible for the equation of inferiority with black skin. 
MacCrone (1957) claims that it is this period in the history of race 
relations that is now making "an adjustment satisfactory to both races, 
the most difficult problem of twentieth century South Africa" (p.136).
Acting on the belief of the inferiority of the black slave early 
psychologists used physiological differences to account for psycho­
logical differences. The next logical step in this development was 
to view human beings as part of a continual process of biological 
evolution. G. Stanley Hall, the founder of child psychology, was a 
proponent of this phylogenetic theory of race. He saw the develop­
ment of the child's mind as mirroring the development of the human 
race. Hence derived the idea of the childlike primitive people in­
capable of reaching the levels of thought which pertained to the 
"civilized’’ world. Piaget's structural theory of genetic epistomology 
also tries to find a parallel betwe n the development of thought in the 
child and growth of knowledge within a society. He sees the former 
as a means of studying the development of collective thought and pro­
poses an interaction theory of development. Piaget, unlike G. Stanley 
Hall, views the environment as a contributing faceor to the development 
of thought, the most Important relationship is between the knower and 
the known.
A refutation of this comes from the. anthropological work of Levi- 
Strauss who denounces the so-called superiority of the technological 
mind and contrasts the logic of mythical thought with the logic of 
modern science (Leach, 1970). He calls the supposedly "savage" mind, 
the "multi-conscious" mind which conceives of reality in terms of the 
individual's encounter with the world : it too is a structuring device. 
Hawkes (1977), discussing Levi-Strauss's structural anthropology 
points out that
"By its undermining of what L£vi-Strauss calls 'sterile 
empiricism', that is, the notion that the 'real' world 
consists of a single undeniable reality which, in their 
ignorance or perversity the lesser 'savage' minds do 
not recognize, such anthropology opens the door to the 
notion that all societies construct their realities in 
accordance with mental or psychological principles that 
determine forms and function, and that they than covertly
project these upon whatever the real world may 
in fact be" (Hawkes; 1977 , pp.55-56).
The instinct psychologist William McDougall also rejected "the crude
idea... that the development of civilization and of nations implies
a parallel evolution of individual minds" (McDougall; 1920, p. 203).
But McDougall (1920) was imbued with the colonial mentality of his
time : not. only did he believe in an instinct of submission, he also
believed that European nations had a moral obligation to raise the
"lower" black people of Africa to the level of European culture.
Psychological studies of Blacks have either chosen to ignore differ­
ences in reality construction or have interpreted these differences in 
terms of the psychologist's own values. Thus the IQ controversy did 
not argue in terms of physical evolution but in terms of inferior social 
experiences. That the instruments of measurement, the test-situations 
and the interpretat of findings have since been exposed as inaccurate 
both methodologically and philosophically^, cannot eradicate the harm 
caused to psychology's role in race relations research. Brigham (1923), 
who came to the conclusions that immigrants and Negroes were mentally 
inferior to American Whites on measures using the Army Alpha and Beta 
tests, was to refute his own work as "unsound" in 1930. Goodenough, 
(Thomas and Sillen, 1972) reconsidering her Draw-a-man test, also came 
to the conclusion that it is impossible to have a culture-free test. 
Cautioning white psychologists James Comer (1977) wrote:
"... it is not responsible science to make assumptions 
about the meaning of black and white differences when 
the 'scientist' does not know the implications of the 
experiential differences. Few researchers have made 
a systematic appraisal of the impact of inequitable and 
traumatic social policy" (Comer; 1970, p. 44).
One of the major criticisms now levelled at studies of black person­
ality, is the implicit assumption and acceptance of a "black" pathology.
*Peter Watson (1973) Race and Intelligence through the looking glass.
A. Thomas & S. Sillen (1972). Racism and Psychiatry.
The most enduring theoretical stance in this respect has been the psycho­
analytic model. The theory of repression was responsible fcr the growth 
of the concept of the unconscious : ideas which are repressed become un­
conscious and do not reach consciousness because of a "continuing press­
ure" (Wollheim; 1971, p. 161). Freud (1973) identified this "pressure" 
as the ego, a force whose function is "reaHty-testing" (Freud; 1973, 
p. 108). The ego is responsible for the anxieties associated with 
repression : Freud (1973) saw the ego as using an "experimental cathexis" 
which "starts v.p the pleasure-impleasure automatism by means of a signal 
of anxiety" (p. 122). The implication of this statement is that the 
libidinal forces Oj. the id, or the pleasurable energy charges, are 
sanctioned by the ego which workes as "the better organized p rt of the 
id" (p. 125). Thus, as the child becomes more aware of reality, that is,
as he develops a form of "ego-awareness", he also grows more aware of his
1
aggressive and instinctual impulses which are not wholly unconscious . A 
typical example of this is the Oedipus complex : here the mother is the 
object of the boy’s libidinal forces, and the anxiety of castration gives 
way to the repression of those forces.
Freudian theory also compares this development of the mind of the 
child with the historical stages of development of the Negro personality. 
Years of compliance and passivity are chought to distort the Negro's 
affective capacity. This "mark of oppression" (Kardiner and Oversey, 1951) 
is thought to lead to defence mechanisms such as aggression (Proshansky and 
Newton, 1973). Conversely, psychoanalytic theory looks at racial pre­
judice as an example of infantile sexuality : the frustration of un- 
fulfilled libidinal instincts are re-acted against a presumed inferior
"... we are in a position to attribute to the id characteristics 
other than that of its being unconscious and you can recognize the 
possibility of portions of the ego and super-ego being unconscious 
without possessing the same primitive and irrational characteristics" 
(Freud; 1973, p. 107).
group of people. Viola Bernard (1953) points out that the psychoanalytic 
stereotype of repressed hostility against whites forming the basis of the 
Negro personality, has now become a racial stereotype. The importance 
of this is that such hostility is presumed to be pathological.
According to Thomas and Sillen (1972) early case studies epitomized 
"a misevaluation of the objective cause of black anger - the real 
oppression" (p. 63). Erikson (1960) questions the assumption of a 
negative Negro identity:
"And yet, is ’the Negro* not often all too summarily and all 
too exclusively discussed in such a way that his negative 
identity is defined only in terms of his defensive adjust­
ments to the dominant white majority?" (Erikson; 1960, p. 155) .
Generalizations were based on the limited number of Negroes committed to 
mental institutions : Lind (1914) discusses psychotic delusions in 
Negroes in terms of the "colour complex". In the first volume of Psycho­
analytic Review Lind (1914) writes that "this complex is based upon 
social subordination of the negro in the United States" (p. 404). He 
interprets the dreams of his patients as "proofs of the repressed wishes 
present in the negro, i.e. to be white," (p. 405) and as evidence of a 
failure to adapt to reality. In the same volume, A.B. Evarts (1914) 
discusses another favourite myth, namely that emancipation from slavery 
was more harmful than beneficial for the stability of the Negro mind :
"It has been said by many observers whose word can scarce be doubted 
that a crazy negro was a rare sight before emancipation" (Evarts; 1914, 
p. 394). The perpetuation of many stereotypes started with these 
early psychoanalytic studies. "This [the African] race has no 
mythology" (Evarts; 1914, p. 392); these "strong, patient, childlike 
savages" (Evarts; 1914, p. 393); "... sexual instincts are peculiarly
unrestrained..." (Evarts; 1914, p. 397) and so forth.
Later Theodore Lidz (1968) propounded the view of maternal domi­
nation in the black family being fundamental to the problems of the
black male. Similarly "culturally deprived" come to equal the poor 
black, a reflection of the shift away from the objective concern for 
poverty to the attributes of those people who are poor (Thomas and Sillen , 
1972). The Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children in the U.S. 
identified "the most important single factor associated with family break­
down" as being "poverty itself" (Thomas and Sillen; 1972, p. 86). So too 
psychoanalytic theory detracted from the real causes of black hostility 
and black anger. F.rikson (1964) anticipated this flaw and developed a 
theory of ego-identity which seas the growth of ego-identity as inex­
tricably linked to "the sameness and continuity of one's meaning fur 
others" (Erikson; 1964, p. 31). Such continuity can only develop when 
one's reality is given meaning by ore's culture : "... societies confirm 
an individual at this time in all kinds of ideological frameworks..." 
(Erikson; 1964, p. 33).
The mid-1920's saw the first empirical studies of race attitudes.
Before this date, the general acceptance of scientific research meant that 
prejudicial attitudes were a norm considered to be quite legitimate. By 
1920 Negroes in America had started to expose the depressed living 
conditions of Negroes in the South and had begun to participate in politi­
cal and literary fields. The structure of American society changed : 
Negroes were placed on an equal footing with Whites during the first World 
War, and after the war, immigrants from maiy different countries poured 
into America. As a result of the latter, Emory Bogardus (1928) wrote 
Immigration and Race Attitudes. This book characterized the social 
problems approach to the study of race prejudice as prejudice was 
studied as a social evil. Bruno Lasker's Race Attitudes in Children 
also appeared in 1928. He approached his subject as a study in human 
relations. Race attitudes were seen as part of the development of other 
social attitudes. He also outlined a programme for a deliberate
educational method designed to modify racial attitudes, a suggestion 
largely ignored until the 1960's.
After the second World War interest focused on group prejudice and 
minority groups. An explanation was sought in the kind of personality 
type that perpetrated acts of racial violence : in 1950 Adorno et a l . 
published The Authoritarian Personality and stated in their introduction 
that
"...the political, economic and social convictions of an 
individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as 
if bound together b> a 'mentality' or 'spirit* and... 
this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in 
his personality" (Adorno et al; 1950, p. 1)
This approach only served to relieve society of responsibility for
institutional racism. Seeking the basis of adult race attitudes in
childhood experience, the authors found that certain factors (for
example, an authoritarian upbringing) could lead to the formation of an
authoritarian personality. Taking its tenets from Freudian theory was
the frustration-aggrission hypothesis which once more focused on the
individual's personality exclusively of institutionalized or social
prejudice.
Experimental research into the development of racial attitudes in 
children began with the Horowitz (1938) and Clark (1939) studies.
R. Horowitz (1938, 1939) developed Attitudinal Choice Tests and Portrait 
Series in order to investigate children's attitudes to another racial 
group. These tests are still the basis of those used today and in them­
selves allow for a great deal of flexibility of content depending on the 
population studied. Horowitz's (1938) theoretical framework, namely 
"race-consciousness conceived as a function of ego-development" (Horowitz 
1939, p. 91) is also the preoccupation of the Clark studies. K. Clark 
and M. Clark (1939) first studied the development of lacial awareness as 
a function of the development of consciousness of self or ego-identity. 
They (Clark & Clark; 1940) extended Horowitz's testing techniques to in-
elude a Colouring-in-Test and tie famous Clark ’Jo11 Test. Clark and 
Clark (1939) found that children nossessed a clear race-and self- 
consciousness by the age of four. Goodman (1964) was to confirm this: 
she found that race awareness was present in children of four years old. 
The Clark findings were cited in a footnote to a U.S. Supreme Court de­
segregation decision in 1954 as evidence of the effect of racial pre­
judice on self-esteem It was this decision that led to the racial de­
segregation of schools in the U.d.A. Later K. Clark (1965) concluded 
that race attitude research had reached a stage of methodological and 
theoretical sterility and stagnation.
Today research into racism once again employs the social problems 
approach, examining the development of race consciousness in a broader 
socio-cultural framework. The philosophical assumptions underlying the 
work of early psychologists have been questioned by Blacks themselves 
(e.g., the idea of black pathology is seen to lead to dehumanization) 
and the focus has shifted from the personality of black people to the 
socio-cultural climate in which racial prejudice flourishes. Psycho- 
logisvs must now attempt to redress the damage caused by, firstly their 
assumptions of pathology specific to the black psyche, secondly, the 
scientific sanction given to much I.Q. research, and thirdly, the 
premise of early intervention programmes that black children are 
products of a deprived environment. An increasing number of psycho­
logists are questioning the usefulness of the white researcher in black 
society:
"under the guise of scientific objectivity a small but powerful 
group of modern psychologists has fully participated in an 
attempt to impose their reality onto a group of people having 
a totally different frame of reference..." (Clark; 1973, p.7);
or "The maintenance of the status quo by contemporary psychologists 
has brought about a crisis in American society..." (Thomas;
1973, p. 60).
One of the means of redress is educational change; not in terms of
11.
compensatory "head-start" programmes which attempt to "help" the black 
child reach a level comparable to a white middle-class child regardless 
of differences in standards of living, but programmes of "intercultural 
and race-related research aimed at changing the education system and 
the larger society" (Sedlacek and Brooks; 1973, p. 194) . In this way, 
a further form of institutional racism is avoided. Host societies are 
"multi-cultural11 yet most educational systems cater foi the dominant 
culture of that society. The misunderstanding caused by ignorance of 
alternative perceptions of the environment and the harsh social realities 
which often give rise to such perceptions, is the cause of some of the major 
social problems of the world.
Thomas and Sillen (1972) stress that psychological expressions of 
racism are consequences and not causes of racism, and in order to be 
able to alleviate social problems, the cause of racial attitudes must be 
identified : "the psychological consequences reinforce the social in­
stitutions of racism" (Thomas; 1972, p. 120). The idea of action re­
search began with the work of Kurt Lewin who postulated that it was 
possible "not only to further the scientific understanding of man but 
also to advance the cause of human welfare at the same time" (Ring; 1967, 
p. 48). The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues was 
founded in order to support the dictum "no research without action, no 
action without research" (Lewin, in Ring; 1967, p. 49). Ping (1967) 
claims that today there is a division between action-oriented and 
scientifically-inclined social psychologists, while experimental social 
psychology is dominated by "frivolous... value!." and a "fun-and-games 
approach" (p. 49). Social psychology has moved into the educational 
field in ord^r to rectify this fun-and-games approach - however it lacks 
that "good theory" Lewin found so necessary to applied research. A 
logical conclusion is to merge developmental, educational and social 
psychology, especially with regard to the developmental study of race
attitudes in a multi-cultural society.
1.2. Aims and Hypotheses
The aim of this research study is to assess the effects of a multi­
racial media programme on the racial attitudes and ego-identity of two 
groups of eight year old children - one black group and one white group. 
The development of racial attitudes and ego-identity form an important 
link in explaining the adult's social reality and self-consciousness. 
This study investigates whether a programme designed to show regular 
multi-racial contact between blacks and whites will change the racial 
attitudes children might hold. It attempts to examine the self- 
concepts of black and white children in order to see whether the devel­
opment of a wider Black identity has counteracted the effect of
institutional racism on the development of ego-identity. Such a study 
takes place against the socio-political climate of South Africa in which 
racial attitudes are reinforced by the established norms of society.
It is hypothesized that:
1. The racial attitudes of two groups of eight year old children (one 
black group and one white group) will change after a multi-racial media 
programme;
2. White children will have more positive self-concepts than black
children before the multi-racial programme;
3. After the intervention programme there will be a change in the ego- 
dentity of black children.
CHAPTER 2
A Developmental approach to the study of ego-identity 
and moral judgement
While empirical studies of race consciousness in children nave 
tentatively examined racial identity in terms of the child's develop­
ment of self (Horowitz, 1939; Clark and Clark 1939, 1940; Goodman,
1946, 1964; Clark, 1955; Proshansky and Newton, 1968; Porter, 1971; 
Milner, 1975), there has seldom been a cogent theoretical stance to 
substantiate the conception of race awareness as a function of self- 
identity . No theoretical justification exists for statements such 
as "racial identification has been assumed to be indicative of a phase 
ii« the development of consciousness of self" (Clark and Clark; 1940, 
p. 159) and "racial awareness functions as a critical variable in ego- 
development" (Gregor and McPherson: 1966, p. 219) and as such race 
attitudes research lacks a base in developmental theory. That such 
research lends itself to a developmental approach might not appear self- 
evident : the development of race prejudice is all too often easily 
explained away be recourse to social learning theory (internalization 
of socializing norms) and questions still remain. How is self-identity 
rooted in the social order? Is the growth of self-identity related to 
the development of morality? Developmental theory employs an historical 
perspective : it views the cognitive and affective growth of the child 
in terms of the effect of past environments on further development.
Stage theorists (Piaget, 1929, 1952; Erikson, 1965) emphasize the inter­
action of the child with these environments and thus view child develop­
ment historically without merely concentrating on the interplay of 
forces within the child (psychoanalytic theory). Any study of the 
development of race awareness in children must be historical : social 
forces in the child's immediate environment have their beginnings in
past environments and the child's interaction with his social reality 
is a result of his developmental process and that of his society. An 
examination of Eriksoa's theory of identity and the cognitive-develop­
mental approach to moral development (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1966, 
1972) will attempt to find an historical root for empirical studies 
of race consciousness.
2.1. Erikson's theory of identity
Due to its popularization general confusion surrounds the use of th ’ 
word "identity". This confusion was generated independently of 
Erikson's reworking of his own implications for the term by a change in 
young people's conception of their role in society in the I960's. It 
is most persistent in describing the "identity" crisis of adolescents 
or the "negative identity" of oppressed groups. It has resulted in a 
multitude of associated wo^ds such as self-identification, self-concept 
or self-esteem, all of which are operational conceptions of a more 
specific unit. Erikson himself recognizes the usefulness of such 
conceptualizations in social psychology but warns against the over­
usage of a term which can detract from "the more vital implications of 
the concept" (Erikson; 1968, p. 16). These implications cannot be 
conceived of solely in terms of adolescent identity-crisis for they 
extend from the initial mother-child interaction to the adult's 
ethical interaction with his society in terms of his ego-strength. 
Erikson's own changing perspectives, from initially viewing identity 
as a sense of continuity and sameness to "identity means what the best 
in you lives by, the loss of which would make you less human" (Erikson 
in Roazen, 1976, p. 164), are a reflection of his preoccupation with an 
historical process in which mankind moves towards more universal 
identities based upon the cyclical growth of the child.
It was this preoccupation that led Erikson to revolutionize psycho­
analytic thought by firmly basing the ego in the social order. He 
rejects the defensive nature of Freudian theory which emphasizes the 
protective mechanisms the ego constructs to defend itself and instead 
stresses the adaptive nature of the ego : "ego-synthesis" is the 
individual's means of mastering experience and it is by recognizing 
that his ego-synthesis "is a successful variant of a group identity 
and in accord with its space-time and life-plan" that "the growing child 
must, at every step, derive a vitalizing sense of actuality" (Erikson; 
1965, p. 228). The crucial point here is that society is -esponsible 
for meeting the individual's ego - requirements, and only when these 
are met, and the ego is able to integrate stages of development, can 
the individual be assured of 'coherent individuation and identity" 
(Erikson; 1965, p. 31). Identity is thus seen to depend firstly, 
on the ego’s mastery of the environment and secondly, on societal recogr* 
nition of this mastery. Erikson conceives of ego-identity as
"...awareness of the fact that there is a self-same­
ness and continuity to the ego's synthesizing 
methods, the style of one's individuality, and that 
this style coincides with the sameness and con­
tinuity of one's meaning for significant others, in 
the immediate community (Erikson; 1968, p. 50).
For Erikson this is the only possible means of human growth (Erikson;
1965, p. 269).
The sense of continuity which he regards as crucial to the develop­
ment of a sense of self begins when the child is able to maintain an 
inner certainty of his mother's existence, even in her absence. Although 
this is reminiscent of Melanie Klein's (1926) object-relation's theory, 
Erikson (1965) rejects the biological conceptions of the outer-world as 
all that is physically outside the infant. Erikson actually sees this 
naive definition of the environment as being responsible for the fail-
ure of early psychoanalytic thought to develop the concept of identity 
in terms of a psychosocial process. Erikson (1965) calls the environ­
ment the macrosphere, "the world shared by others" (Erikson; 1965, p. 
214) and sees play as emerging to bridge the gap between the micro­
sphere (objects) and the macrosphere. Erikson first regarded play as a 
function of the ego, as "the royal road to understanding the infantile 
ego's efforts at synthesis" (Erikson; 1965, p. 202). Later (1978) he 
saw in play a means of understanding reality : imagination "is placed 
in the service both of an inner ordering of experience and of ritual- 
ization of everyday life which introduces the growing individual into 
functioning institutions" (Erikson; 1978, p. 167). It is thus through 
play that Erikson sees the ego as entering into its interaction with 
the social environment. Yet as an interactionist Erikson (1968) is 
careful to point out that identity is not defined solely in terms of 
the ego's relation to social reality, but is also embedded in the
individual life-cycle of the child :
"we cannot separate personal growth and communal 
change, nor can we separate the identity crisis 
in individual life and contemporary crises in 
historical development because the two help to 
define each other and are truly relative to each 
other" (Erikson; 1968, p. 23).
It is identity though that provides equilibrium between the individual
and the social order.
Erikson (1968) distinguishes between identity, identification and 
identity formation. Throughout the stages of his development (Erikson, 
1965, postulated eight stages of man) the child forms identifications
uith basic social and cultural models which in turn reinforce his ego's
attempts at mastery. But none of these childhood identifications 
result in "a functioning personality" (Erikson; 1968, p. 158). The 
reason for this is that during adolescence identity formation begins to
incorporate and replace all previous identifications. This is a forma­
tive period when the adolescent must come to grasp a unity between him­
self and society and recognize continuity over and above role confusion.
He must select "self-images" (Erikson; 1968, p. 210) derived from child­
hood identifications and integrate them with his present attempts at 
ideological clarification. What Eriks m  is stipulating is that the 
period of adolescence is characterized by a search for ideals which 
necessitates an ideological base, and yet the ego must somehow unite 
past identifications with the new conscious awareness inherent in the
individual. To this end Erikson (1968) distinguishes between selx-and 
ego-identity. The latter is characterized by "the actually attained 
but for ever to-be revised sense of the reality of the Self within social 
reality" (Erikson; 1968, p.211). It is the knowledge of the integration 
of several selves, or several identifications that results in self-identity. 
Erikson thus distinguishes between the environmentally-based ego-identity 
and the individually-based self-identity as a natural development from 
the simple postulate that society reinforces "the values by which the ego 
exists" (Erikson; 1965, p. 269).
Roazen (1976) levels his major criticism of Erikson1s theory of 
identity at the strength of the ego's mastery in uniting the inner and 
outer worlds : "we will want to question whether or not ego psychology need 
lead to a complacency which justifies the social status quo" (Roazen; 1976, 
p. 27). His criticism arises from the faith Erikson seems to place in 
the established social order as a signpost to guide the growing child 
and in Erikson1s belief in a universal identity for all mankind, achieved 
without any change in social institutions. Erikson* s own moral code led 
him to explain oppressive societies in terms of what he calls "pseudo- 
species" (Erikson; 1965, p. 402) . Such groups set themselves up as demi­
gods and sanction individuals' choices of negative social roles which
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result in the development of negative identity or pseudo-identities. In
an examination of the Sioux Indian tribe, Erikson (1965) found a negative
group identity, an identity destroyed by the arrival of the white man :
"...step for stop, the Sioux has been denied the bases 
for a collective identity formation and with it that 
reservoir of collective integrity from which the 
individual must derive his stature as a social being"
(Erikson; 1965, p. 148).
While Erikson*s stages involve both positive and negative elements 
(basic trust versus basic mistrust; autonomy versus shame and doubt), he 
sees oppressed groups as incorporating the negative images of the pseudo­
species (or the majority) in their own negative identity. Where actual 
roles become unattainable, individuals may identify with stereotyped 
fragments of their historical identity. In attempting to overcome the
problem of pseudo-identities, Erikson maintains that all mankind is search­
ing for a universal identity; and if is on this point that Roazen (1976) 
calls Erikson an idealist who proposes no institutional change and is 
therefore conservative in outlook.
Such criticism is undoubtedly justified : Erikson views each stage 
as a crisis in development, but the ego is responsible for restoring
equilibrium between the individual and the social order. Therefore, at
for example, the second stage of development, autonomy versus shame and 
doubt, the ego is responsible for establishing a "sense" of self-control 
without losing its self-esteem (Roazen, 1976, also criticizes Erikson* s 
continual use of the word "sense" of; he asks whether the ego actually 
does establish self-control). As this is a further stage in the growth
of ego-identity the environment is already at work on the young child :
"... an environment which, in a, feels called upon 
to convey .^o him its parti ir ideas and concepts 
of autonomy and coercion iu ways decisively con­
tributing to the character and the health of her 
personality in his culture..." (Erikson; 1965, 
p. 263).
This is a definite buttressing of a stable, continuous environment which, 
while plausible, does not mean that the culture inculcated into the 
child is necessarily "good" (Roazen, 1976). Not only has this stage 
immediate conformist implications, it carrier, these into the future life 
of the adult in that "the sense of autonomy fostered in the child and 
modified as life progresses, serves (and is served by) the preservation 
in economic and political life of a sense of justice" (Erikson; 1965, 
p. 246). Thus the moral development of the child begins in the early 
stages of the development of identity. Ruuzen (1976) asks whether
Erikson "has not put too much trust in the benign functions of the social
order" (Roazen; 1976, p. 44) and this trust actually seems to account 
for Erikson's idealistic belief in the fact that once all stages are 
successfully resolved a "new manner of man" (Erikson; 1965, p. 406) will
begin to develop a judicious way of life. Towards the end of Childhood
and Society (p. 402), Erikson (1965) cautions against a misinterpretation 
of the concept of ego-identity. He states that the ego does not merely 
conform to social roles, but "adapts these roles to the further processes 
of his ego, thus doing his share in keeping the social process alive" 
(Erikson; 1965, p. 402). The question is whether or not certain social 
processes should retain their sameness, or should they be changed by that 
"judicious man"?
2 . 2 .  Cognitive aspects of Erikson's theory of identity
Erikson's eight stages of man are anchored in what he calls the epi­
genesis of individual development, that is the growth of organisms from 
the uterus in accordance with a "ground plan" (Erikson; 1964, p. 92).
The epigenetic principle is the basi of stage theory in that the child 
is said to follow inner laws of development which, while varying from 
culture to culture, remain within "'the proper rate and proper sequence’
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This is a definite buttressing of a stable, continuous environment which, 
while plausible, does not mean that the culture inculcated into the 
child is necessarily "good" (Roazen, 1976.) . Not only has this stage 
immediate conformist implications, it carries thi*£ e into the future life 
of the adult in that "the sense of autonomy fostered in the child and 
modified as life progresses, serves (and is served by) the preservation 
in economic anr1 political life of a sense of justice" (Erikson; 1965, 
p. 246). Thus the moral development of the child begins in the early 
stages of the development of identity. Roazen (1976) asks whether
Erikson "has not put too much trust in the benign functions of the social
order" (Roazen; 1976, p. 64) and this trust actually seems to account 
for Erikson's idealistic belief in the fact that once all stages are 
successfully resolved a "new manner of man" (Erikson; 1965, p. 406) will
begin tc develop a judicious way of life. Towards the end of Childhood
and Society (p. 402) , Erikson (1965) cautions against a misinterpretation 
of the concept of ego-identity. He states that the ego does not merely 
conform to social roles, but "adapts these roles to the further processes 
of his ego, thus doing his share in keeping the social process alive" 
(Erikson; 1965, p. 402). The question is whether or net certain social 
processes should retain their sameness, or should they be changed by that 
"judicious man"?
2.2. Cognitive aspects of Erikson's theory of identity
Erikson*s eight stages of man are anchored in what he calls the epi­
genesis of individual development, that is the growth of organisms from 
the uterus in accordance with a "ground plan" (Erikson; 1964, p. 92).
The epigenetic principle is the basis of stage theory in that the child 
is said to follow inner laws of development which, while varying from 
culture to culture, remain within '"the proper rate and proper sequence'
which governs all epigenesis" (Erikson; 1968, p. 93). Erikson has 
relied on the work of Jean Piaget to bolster his predominantly affect­
ive theory just as Piaget (1929) sees a necessary correspondence 
between cognitive and affective aspects for the development of reality 
orientations (Kohlberg, 1966). Erikson (1964) acknowledges that "it 
is the joint development of cognitive and emotional powers paii ?d with 
appropriate social learning which enables the individual to realize the 
potentialities of a stage"(Erikson ? 1964, p. 225), and that "cognitive 
orientation forms not a contrast but a complement to the need of young 
people to develop a sense of identity" (Erikson; 1968, p. 245)•
Erikson has extracted from cognitive theory a concentration on the 
healthy ego (ego-identity) which is responsible for the functioning 
personality or what Piaget (in Erikson; 1964, p. 135) calls the "unity 
of personality". Cognitive developmentalists themselves regard the ego 
as a central regulator and integrator of the personality : they "recog­
nize the organizing role of the self, or ego, in social development" 
(Kohlberg; 1966, p. 125). Piaget though sees cognitive-structural 
change and not affective change as responsible for reality orientation. 
Erikson (1964) cites Piaget as rejecting the claim that he (Piaget) had 
found the structural unity underlying the functional unity of a healthy 
child. Erikson (1964) himself asserts that such unity is found in the 
strengths of the ego in its relation to epigenetic development. Erikson
(1964) calls "conflict" (Piaget's term to denote the need for structural 
change) between the ego and the environment a "crisis" and acknowledges 
that only by understanding the "functional unity of the personality" 
(that is, the ability to integrate physiological, mental and emotional 
functions) can the over-all stages of development be grasped (Erikson; 
1964, p. 141).
The egocentric style of speech the child uses at the early stages
of cognitive development finds its parallel in Erikson's (1965) micro-and 
macro-spheres. At first the child's speech resembles a continual mono­
logue, regardless of the presence of others. Yet as he grows older, 
society demands a more communicative speech pattern from him and the 
child i forced to adapt his egocentric speech to a pattern recognizing 
the outer world (Erikson's macrosphere). This functional aspect of 
cognitive growth is paralleled by the individual's conception of his ego- 
strength : the child decentres from Self towards a greater understanding 
of the external world which at the s^me time results in increased com­
prehension of Self. For Erikson (1964) this means the resolution of a 
crisis and further integration of identifications for ego-identity devel­
opment. Just as the child learns to react according to "whatever 
connotation this happens to have in the coordinates of his culture's 
space-time" (Erikson; 1965, p. 227), so too does he develop the necessary 
cognitive structures to be able to assimilate those environmental factors 
necessary for further structural change.
Erikson's (1965) initial identification if play as a function of the 
~go is synonymous with Piaget's (1929) idea of the young child's symbolic 
play which Piaget sees as providing an adaptation towards reality.
Symbolic play involves the use of mental symbols which are, however, 
embedded in physical reality. Similarly the development of symbolic 
thought arises from concepts which have their basis in the social order 
(Kohlberg, 1966). Piaget, as a genetic epistemologist, is also aware 
of an historical perspective which links cognitive development with socio­
genesis, collective development. For Erikson (1968) it is "mutuality", 
a mutual affirmation of egos between the individual and his society, that 
accounts for a psychosocial identity; for Piaget (1954) it is the 
child's cognitive construction of reality that affirms such an identity.
2.3. Erikson and moral development
While Erikson*b theory of identity is complemented by aspects of 
cognitive developmental theory, it is in the field of moral development 
that Erikson * s ideas need much amplification and clarification : although 
he sees in the growth of ego-identity the rudiments of moral development, 
he does little to amplify his ideas, except as they relate to his own 
moral code. Each of Erikson * s stages exemplify the concepts of a "good" 
and an "evil" and it is by resolving the crises of the stages that the 
"good" is incorporated into the individual's identity development. At 
the sime time ego-identity only gains real strength by societal recog­
nition. Therefore the individual's morality must be society-based. 
Erikson (1968) regards moralities as outliving themselves and it is for 
this reason that he places more stress on the ethical stance of adult­
hood .
Erikson (1968) distinguishes between childhood morality, the 
ideological pattern of adolescence and the ethics of the adult. He 
states that only "a gradually accruing sense of identity" makes for "a 
sense of humanity" (Erikson; 1968, p. 402). Roazen's (1976) criticism 
of Erikson's use of "sense of" extends to a criticism of whether Erikson 
has not placed ethical concepts in the idea of ego-strength by postulating 
an ideal form of development rather than an actuality. While at the 
second stage of his ego development the child is "in constant need for 
new everyday ritual?zations of moral discrimination in words and sounds 
truly corresponding to a shared moral climate which the child can compre­
hend - and experiment with" (Erikson; 1978, p. 95). The child thus 
develops autonomy of self. However, in the third stage of development 
(initiative versus guilt) he is confronted with the destructive drives of 
sexual guilt. It is because of this guilt chat the child searches for 
identifications with the good, or with ideal types that his parents can
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present to him in the form of, for example, fairy-tales. His initiative 
in this search is governed by conscience, an inner voice, and Erikson 
(1968)call3 this "the ontogenetic cornerstone of morality" (Erikson; 1968, 
p. 119). The child is governed by moral rules which he incorporates for 
fear of retaliation.
It is this initial division between conscience and guilt that leads 
to the ideological basis of adolescence. At this stage, in order to
consolidate his identity, the individual is placed in the position of 
having to choose between his own ideals, with their ideological conno­
tations, and the social goals of his society. He attempts to find 
social values to guide his identity but a crisis arises when he feels 
"that the environment tries to deprive him too radically of all the forms 
of expression which permit him to develop and integrate the next step...
Q n  his development^" (Erikson; 1968, p. 130). Erikson (1968) states 
that although society may not recognize the adolescent's inner identity 
(identity crisis), it grants him a moratorium in which to resolve crises 
such as ethnic and sexual confusion. Erikson (1968) postulates that 
"the social institution which is the guardian of identity is what we have 
called ideology" (Erikson; 1968, p. 133). Yet at no stage does he 
suggest changing institutions to improve the general plight of mankind.
It is at this point that Erikson's concern with ethical values 
begins. Ethical rules, as opposed to moral rules, are concerned with 
ideals and these can only arise from "an informed and inspired search for 
a more inclusive identity" (Erikson; 1964, p. 242). While conceptualizing 
the judicious world of adults as a ritual of "meaningful regularity"
Erikson (1978) states that it fails to provide the next generation with 
workable rules:
"the judicious ritual at large, with its task of 
establishing objective legal guilt as a threatening
"example to potential culprits, is all too often 
too far removed from the subjective process 
which makes a person feel morally liable"
(Erikson; 1978, pp. 96-97).
In such an instance, an adult should be able to discount societal morals 
in favour of his own ethical principles. Once more, there is no 
suggestion of changing the judicious ritual. It is instead pseudo­
species that hamper the quest of mankind for a universal identity based 
on ethical principles. From this one could drav the conclusion that 
for Erikson, people with negative identities are not able to achieve 
the ethical ideal of a wider, human identity. As Roazen (1976) points 
out, in Erikson* 3 later writings the term "identity" itself takes on 
ethical connotat u.«s. Erikson (1968) begins to equate identity with 
ethical convictions.
Where Erikson* s ideas on moral development fail is in his inability 
to provide a structural unity for the development of morality across 
cultures. Since ego-strength is reinforced by societal norms, changes 
ir these norms suggest a corresponding change in the developmental 
process of identity. Yet at no stage does Erikson actually proffer 
change in societal institutions - he places his faith in human infancy 
as being "the bedrock of ethics" (Roazen; 1976, p. 155) but does not 
broach the role of the ego in structuring moral development. A cog­
nitive-based theory of moral development considers the structure under­
lying moral judgement, and is found in the work of Piaget (1932) and 
Kohlberg (1969, 1971).
2.4. Piaget's theory of moral development
According to Erikson, ego-identity is the knowledge of the self 
within social reality and the child's morality is a product of identity 
development. Piaget (1932) traces the progress of moral development in 
the child in terms of the development of an autonomous self, an ego 
able to differentiate the externa1 thoughts of others from his self.
A similarity exists between Piaget's concept of cooperation, the child 
"will learn to understand the other person and be understood by him" 
(Piaget; 1932, p. 90), and Erikson's theory of ego-identity as "the 
accrued confidence that the inner sameness and conformity are matched by 
sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others" (Erikson; 1965, p. 
253). for Piaget, cooperation between children, and between adults and 
children is the distinguishing feature of an autonomous person for whom 
the development of a sense of justice proceeds naturally. Unlike 
Erikson, Piaget finds a parallel between cooperative social relations 
and the development of a cooperative individual; the characteristics of 
the former "create within people's minds the consciousness of ideal norms 
at the back of all '•ules" (Piaget; 1932, p. 402) and it is a system of 
rules that Piaget sees as basic to all morality. Thus while Erikson 
conceives of cooperation between the ego and society as resulting in a 
broad, common identity for mankind that is ethically "ideal", Piaget 
actually distinguishes a society of constraint from one of cooperation, 
the development of the latter mirroring the growth of autonomy in 
children. Erikson's autonomous child (stage two) is still dependent on 
the affirmation of his ego by the adult world while for Piaget, cooper­
ation or consciousness of self as separate from others, arises from the 
liberation of oneself "from the. thought and will of others" (Piaget;
1932, p. 87). This is more realistic that; Erikson's postulation of an 
ideal ego-identity as Piaget traces the moral development of the child 
in terms of the growing separation of the ego from its dependence on the 
social order : there is not the continuity and sameness between ego and 
society found in Erikson's theory of identity.
In fact Erikson's second stage (autonomy versus shame and doubt) is 
paralleled by Piaget's idea of hetcronomy (or morality of constraint) in 
which "society is not so much a successful cooperation between equals as
a feeling of continuous communion between the ego and the World of the 
Elder or Adult" (Piaget; 1932, p. 49). The child is centred around 
self (egocentrism), and although he is able to imitate rules, he plays 
alone independently of others. Yet egocentrism is dependent upon adult 
constraint and moral realism which involve unilateral respect for 
authority. Adult constraint reinforces egocentrism : the outside world 
is presumed to be outside the concern of the child's mind and is thus 
accepted as such. The child tends "to materialize and project into the 
universe the realities of social life" (Piaget; 1932, p. 184) and moral 
laws are "conceived as existing in themselves, independently of the 
mind, and in consequence independently of individual circumstances and 
of intentions" (Piaget; 1932, 136). Adult constraint thus functions
independently of the child and is thus complied to, though without 
comprehension of the link between the child's own actions and the 
external rules. It is only when the child separates his own ego from 
the outside world that he is able to develop a morality of cooperation as 
opposed to a heteronomous concept of morality.
For Piaget, a sense of justice develops independently of adult 
examples and "require nothing more for its development than the mutual 
respect and solidarity which holds among children themselves" (Piaget; 
1932, p. 196) . A sense of autonomy can only arise when equality takes 
precedence over authority, when the child does not, out of duty and fear 
of punishment, conform to adult authority. For Eril son, this would be 
the point of division between the morality of the child and the ethical 
position of adulthood. Piaget, however, by distinguishing between 
societies of constraint and cooperation, recognizes that children can 
confuse authority with justice :
"The ethics of authority, which is that of duty and 
obedience, leads, in the domain of justice, to the 
confusion of what is just with the content of
established law and to the acceptance of 
expiatory punishment" (Piaget; 1932, p. 324).
Erikson too has perhaps confused authority with justice when he 
states that the child's autonomy finds its "institutional safeguard in the 
principle of law and order" (Erikson; 1965, p. 246). This is not the
case with Piaget for wcom only peer group cooperation results in a true
knowledge of equality over authority : "but for true equality and a 
genuine desire for reciprocity there must be a collective rule which is 
the sui generis product of life lived in ommon" (Piaget; 1932, p. 317). 
While this has hypothetical1y, much in common with Erikson's idea of 
a collective identity, Piaget is more explicit in delineating the 
structural development of morality in terns of a "law of evolution"
(1932, p. 225). He found that as the moral development of children
proceeds "the desire for equality... seems... to grow more acute"
(p. 274) and he sees peer group cooperation as the main reason for this. 
However, the moral solidarity that exists between children can also be 
held responsible for the development of group consciousness based on 
moral content and not moral form. A society of constraint will in all 
probability result in the formation of group consciousness based on the 
principle of constraint or expiative justice. Yet "the more complex 
the society, the mi. r*‘ autonomous is the personality and the more im­
portant are the relations of cooperation between equal individuals" 
(Piaget; 1932, p. 336). A conformist society is more likely to further 
constraint among individuals, and thus an objective as opposed to 
subjective sense of responsibility is fostered. Rules are handed down 
to individuals and it is their duty to preserve the morality inherent 
in such rules. A comparison could possibly be made here w" ch Erikson's 
pseudo-identities, negative identities developing in terms of the rules 
of the larger pseudo-identity. Piaget's social cooperation is the
ideal of a democratic community; for Erikson, a democratic community 
will not give rise to pseudo-identities.
2.5. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development
Kohlberg's (1970) theory of moral development is, of all such 
theories, the one most frequently applied to empirical research. The 
applicability of his theory rests in his clear delineation of moral 
stages, six in all, and yet his concept of morality is basically philo­
sophical. His stages form a hierarchy in moral adequacy, the last 
stage which is principle orientated towards justice is a personal choice 
on Kohlberg's part. Of course, the same criticism has been levelled 
against Erikson. Where the value of Kohlberg's approach lies, is in 
his emphasis on role-taking opportunities for moral growth. He takes 
greater cognizance of the effect of social forces on stages of moral 
thought than does Piaget, and by studying the relation of moral thought 
to moral conduct and emotion, incorporates the theories of ego-psycho- 
logists into his work. Each of his stages is dependent upon the level 
of maturity reached by the child’s moral judgement, or level of ego- 
identity on which the child's moral judgement is based.
In a study of how the cognix learning of sex-role concepts lead 
to the development of masculine > ».e values, Kohlberg (1966) em­
phasizes five points : frstly the child tends to schematize interests 
that are consistent wii ild ones - this is of course allied to Piaget’s 
concept of assimilation. Secondly value judgement were found to be 
consistent with self-conceptual identity. Although Kohlberg (1966) 
concludes that :
"the moralization of sex-role differences... is 
not part of a general identification-intemal- 
ization process through which sex-roles are 
reputedly l earned, but is onl’„ one of several 
mechanisms through which developing sex-role 
concepts influence attitudes" (Kohlberg;
1966, p. 123)
he does state that the child tends to value his own gender-identity 
positively as he values anything similar to himself positively - or 
in terms of "good". This is similar to the two polarities of 
Erikson's stages. The child tends to identify with the good as a 
prototype of his ego-identity. Like Piaget, Kohlberg (1966) states 
that it is the objectification of the ego that results in more objective 
value-judgements: "increased tendencies toward objective and consistent 
conceptualizations of the self" result in "increased tendencies towards 
objective and consistent values" (p. 113). Kohlberg (1966) thus syn­
thesizes Piaget and Erikson's theories. There is a move towards a 
cognitive balance between self-concept and value judgements. This 
balance results in the equation of the self with the good, and the 
subsequent performance of activities that the self judges as good, and 
at the same time those activities that are judged as good are a part of 
the self. Thus gender-identity develops from a "basic physical reality 
judgement made relatively early in the child's development" (Kohlberg; 
1966, p. 164). Sex-role stereotypes develop in children at about the 
age of four.
The third of Kohlberg's (1966) conditions for masculine-feminine 
values has been alluded to, positive values such as prestige or com­
petence are related to sex-role stereotypes. Kohlberg (1966) 
maintains that. White's (1959) theory of competence motivation accounts 
for this : the child is motivated to achieve in what is recognized as 
a competent role. In this way stereotypes such as masculine power 
come to be conceived of as good. This also elucidates Erikson's idea 
of ego-identity being confirmed by society : it is possible that society 
confirms the adaptation of the individual to conformity, or stereotyped 
roles. Kohlberg (1966) notes fourthly the "tendency to view basic 
conformity to one's role as moral" (p. Ill), in other words "conformity
to a general socio-moral order" (p. 111). Thus if it appears that 
society conceives of masculinity in terms of power, "power" takes or. 
moral implications as one is conforming to societal values. The final 
category is the tendency towards imitation. People who are valued as 
been prestigious or competent, or who are perceived to be similar to 
self, are imitated because they are associated with "good".
This leads to Kohlberg's (1970) level of conventional role con­
formity in which the individual maintains the expectations of his peers 
and the social order. This respect for authority is a parallel to 
Piaget's heteronomous stage, except for Kohlberg, his levels underlie 
six stages : adjustment rather than development occurs when an individ­
ual's end-point is this level of conventional role conformity. Thus 
what Piaget (1932) saw as child-based, Konlberg (1970) views as adult 
conformity to principles of law and order.
The final level of moral development, the post-conventional level, 
relates to Erikson's (1968) ethical stage and Piaget's (1932) autonomous 
individual. For Kohlberg (1970), the moral reasoning at this stage is 
abstract and involves, unlike Piaget's stage, conflict with conventional 
standards rather than cooperation. Cooperation for Kohlberg (1970) 
involves a social contract between members of a society for the common 
good of that society, and can also be related to the post-conventional 
level. But personal principles morality views rules as subject to 
change, even if this involves conflict as to what is right or wrong- 
conflict between personal principles and the social contract. Keniston
(1970) reports that Kohlberg has found that the post-conventional stages 
"are never reached by most men and women in American society who remain 
at the conventional stage" (Keniston; 1970, p. 442).
CHAPTER 3
Developmental theories, ego-identity and racial attitudes
The theories discussed above are important for a specific reason : 
empirical research into ego-identity and racial attitudes in children 
has been described as "fragmentary and incomplete" (Proshansky and 
Newton, 1973). Not only have research tools been responsible for this, 
but there has also been a lack of theoretical justification for empiri­
cal findings. Erikson's theory elucidates much 'identity" and "self- 
concept" research, while Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg's (1966, 1970) 
theories provide a framework for the relation of moral development to 
racial attitudes.
3.1. Erikson
Erikson's theory of identity is a useful frame of reference to 
explain the findings of many empirical studies that black children 
exhibit a negative self-identity (Clark and Clark, 1939; Horowitz,
1939; Porter, 1971). The applicability of his theory adds weight to 
an historical and developmental approach to the study of negative self- 
identity, a concept which has been criticized as merely "reinforcing 
the syndrome which it suggests exists" (McCarthy and Yancey; 1971, p. 
197;. Yet Erikson (1966) himself is careful not to read into the 
concept any suggestion of pathology and states that the Negro's 
negative identity is not to be viewed "only in terms of his defensive 
adjustments to the dominant white majority..." (p. 155). A further 
criticism often levelled at empirical investigations of black self- 
concept is their failure to incorporate African conceptions of self. 
Nobles (1973) states that while the Western conception of self is indi­
vidualistic, the African conception is of an extended self without a
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clear dichotomy between "I" and "we". Erikson's concept of ego-identity 
actually provides for a continuity between the "I" and the "we", the 
final collective identity representing a fusion between egos - chat of 
society and that of the individual.
The cornerstone of Erikson's theory of ego-identity is the crisis of 
each stage which the individual must resolve. The child is offered 
prototypes of good and evil and his ego-strength usually involves the 
mastery of the good as opposed to the evil. Erikson (1966) postulates 
that the Negro child is presented with a good defined in terms of the 
dominant white majority, while the evil is actually the majority's 
conception of the Negro in terms of derogatory stereotypes. Thus black 
per se is represented as evil and the Negro child develops an awareness 
of the majority culture's conception of his skin-colour : "he is inferior 
because he is black" (Ziajka; 1972, p. 252). Erikson (1968) maintains 
that an "estrangement from national and ethnic origins" (p. 173) leads 
to the adoption of a negative identity. Yet it is an identity based on 
"all those identifications and roles which, at the critical stages of 
development, have been presented to them as most undesirable or dangerous 
and yet also as most real" (Erikson; 1968, p. 174). The identifications 
presented to the Negro child are in terms of an undesirable ego-identity, 
yet as this is part and parcel of the individual's actual selr (that is, 
his skin colour), he develops a negative self-identity. By accepting 
a negative identity, the Negro's role is affirmed by the white majority.
If the individual's ego-identity only gains strength from the meaning it 
has in a certain culture, the Negro child is compelled to adopt a negative 
ego-identity in order to achieve some recognition within his culture.
That the negative identity is dependent on an oppressive culture is 
evinced by the more positive self-images now being demonstrated by Blacks 
in terms of the growth of black consciousness (Hraba and Grant, 1970).
In terms of the historical perspective embedded in Erikson’s approach, 
negative ego-identity must also be examined in relation to the history 
of a society that has produced such identities. Erikson's theory is 
embedded in psychosocial relat'vity. He states that "to discuss the 
identity problem... means to play into cultural history, or, perhaps to 
become its tool" (Erikson; 1968, p. 27). Erikson (1964) asserts that 
under slave conditions three Negro identities emerged: firstly the oral- 
sensual tradition related to music; secondly an evil identity related 
to the subjugation of the Negro by Lhe white man and thirdly the identity 
of the "white man's Negro," the Negro who adapted himself to the slave 
owner's demands, the Uncle Tom's of American slave history. What 
Erikson maintains is that these stereotypes have become fragmented and 
incorporated into the white man's conception of the Negro, and it is 
these fragments that in turn form a negative ego-identity. Ziajka 
(197*0 suggests that after slavery, Negroes had no conscious awareness 
of the past as this was destroyed by Whites. What Ziajka might mean 
is that the Neg/o had no awareness of a past identity independent of 
Whiles as he was defined in terms of the White man's need, a view which 
then came to dominate stereotype conceptions of his role in American 
society. The system of slavery and its implications for ego-identity 
were carried into the policy of segregation which is tantamount to 
encouraging the growth of negative ego-identities in Blacks; in South 
Africa such identity is defined in terms of second-class citizenship.
According to Erikson (1968), ego-identity is dependent on but not 
defined by, past identifications. Adolescents integrate thesa identi­
fications in tirms of their future role in society. The adolescent 
crisis of role confusion often presents itself much earlier in black 
children. Erikson (1964) relates he story of a Negro girl who could 
only conceive of something white as something good. Erikson maintains
v V
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that this example
"points to the depth of the identity disturbance caused 
in people who are made to feel so inexorably ’different* 
that legal desegregation can only be the beginning of a 
long and painful inner re-identification - not to speak 
of true participation in : more inclusive new identity”
(Erikson; 1964, p. 94).
It is important to realize that for the Black American "feelings of 
inferiority are entirely natural" (Milner; 1975, p. 146) as the ma­
jority role for the Negro is one of inferiority. Jahoda (1961) found 
inferiority to be an intrinsic part of Ghanaian's conceptions of them­
selves before independence. Fanon (1968) conceives of the black man's 
inferiority as being the creation of a racist majority. It would, 
perhaps, be easy to ignore empirical research and assert that the idea 
of a negative self-identity is itself a majority stereotype, but this 
only detracts from the destructiveness and harm an oppressive society 
can perpetrate : Erikson recognizes that pseudo-societies create 
individuals with negative identities, both the oppressor and the 
oppressed are party to such identities in a pseudo-society.
It is the development of a group iuentity based on negative identi­
ties that Erikson maintains results in a positive group identity :
"If we wish to find witnesses to a radically different 
awareness of the relation of positive and negative 
identity, we have only to change our historical 
perspective and luok to Negro writers i- this country 
today" (Erikson; 1968, p. 25).
He sees in the Negro's affirmation of a negative identity the means of
a "collective recovery" (Erikson; 1968, p. P.5) and states that this is
"a universal trend among the exploited" (p. 25). Thus in India,
identity formed the psychological core of liberation from colonial rule,
resulting in an internal and an external emancipation. Fundamental to
the development of positive identity is the ability to confront one's
own ego-identvty. Thus Thomas (1970) sees social competence resulting
from "a new black ethic based upon psychocultu *1 factors, racial
awareness, identity and pride" (p. 265) the basic posits of Erikson's 
(1968) "wider identity". The new black consciousness can create a posi­
tive group identity independent of the white man : "the struggle of black 
men has become symbolic of the struggle of al? oppressed groups to 
achieve dignity and respect in the face of bigotry and discrimination" 
(Proshansky and Newton; 1973, p. 209). Thus the quest for a group 
identity is ideological, a fact that predominates Erikson's theory of 
identity :
"identity and ideology are two aspects of the sai»j 
process. Both provide the necessary condition 
for further individual maturation, and with it, 
for the next higher form of identification, 
namely, the solidarity of linking common iden­
tities" (Erikson; 1964, p. 37).
Just as the black child's consciousness of self develops in terms of 
racial identity, so dees the ego-identity of white children develop 
according to the roles most accepted by the dominant culture. Unless 
the child develops into Erikson's ethical adult, in a conservative 
society he will confirm the conservatism of Erikson's ego-identity by 
developing at one with nis society, and by eventually reinforcing the 
ideology of his ego-identity within a particular society. Erikson
(1965) is concerned with just such an ideology in his discussion of the 
American identity :
"The middle class, preoccupied as it is with matters of 
real estate and consumption, or status and posture, 
will include more and more of the highly gifted and 
fortunate, but if it does not yield to the wider 
identity of the Negro American it obviously creates 
new barriers between the few and the mass of the 
Negroes (Erikson; 1966, p. 317).
It is not surprising that there has been a burgeoning of studies inves­
tigating the development of racial attitudes in white children as an 
antidote to eradicating racial prejudice in adults. Since the basis of 
identity formation is ideological the^e develops a polarity between the 
ego-identiuy of white children and that of black children. According to
Erikson (1968), it is the duty of the middle-class to "yield to the wider 
identity of the Negro American" (p. 317), and surely the starting point 
for such a move is the eradication of discrimination in society and thus 
of racial prejudice in children. Erikson does not draw such a con­
clusion. It is in the development of the young white child's ego-ident- 
ity that society has the chance to change its demands on the child, and 
at the same time incorporate aspects of the wider identity into its own 
collective identity. Only in this way will Erikson's idea of an ident­
ity for mankind materialize.
Roazen (1976) points out that Erikson does not elucidate the harmful 
effects of a white middle-class upbringing on the ego-identity of the 
young child but only points to the benefits "in terms of the internal 
dynamics of the individuals" (Roazen; 1976, p. 35). Such benefits may 
at the same time be "socially harmful and noxious : one has only to think 
of the positive role many racist institutions play in overcoming individ­
ual guilt and anxiety" (Roazen; 1976, p. 36). Roazen (1976) points out 
that Erikson's moral code does little by way of postulating societal 
improvements; it is a code in which the child will be morally "good" 
if he resolves each stage in his ego-development; what then of the 
Negro child who develops a negative identity? Such issues, Roazen 
(1976) maintains "can he resolved to the satisfaction of our conscience 
only because we have already decided upon our moral premises" (p. 170). 
Thus although Erikson's theory is useful in helping to e(plain the 
development of negative identities in Blacks, he is working from a 
premise in which an ideal environment will create only positive id un­
ities .
3.2. Erikson's ego stages and cognitive-development theory
Although the concept "ego-identity" has been operationalized into 
"self-concept" or "self-worth," Erikson's theory remains an ideal ex­
planation of the development of ego-identity, and one that is difficult 
to examine empirically. Kohlberg (1973) characterizes Erikson's 
functional approach as a focus on the changing self of the growing child 
in a constant socio-moral world. On the other hand, the structural 
approaches of Piaget and Kohlberg "represent a series of increasingly 
adequate cognitions of a relatively constant physical and social world" 
(Kohlberg; 1973, p. 51). Kohlberg (1973) views moral development as a 
contributory factor to ego development and thus seeks to link the cog­
nitive-developmental approach with Erikson's ego-oriented theory:
"While Erikson's stages cannot be defined, measured, 
or logically handled in the same sense as cognitive- 
developmental stages, suggestive empirical relations 
between ego-identity terms and moral stages are 
found" (Kohlberg; 1971, p. 1077).
The important point to note here is that cognitive-developmental the­
ories lend themselves to empirical investigation; the theories as such 
are themselves modifiable in terms of experimental results. Given a 
theoretical link between Erikson and the cognitive-developmentalists, 
studies which find a relationship between highly principled subjects and 
"identity achievement" (Kohlberg and Gilligan; 1971, p. 1077) are 
proffering support for Erikson's theory of identity. In addition such 
studies relate Kohlberg's moral stages to an ego-developmental approach, 
an integration Kohlberg (1973) examined. He tabulated a "loose fit" 
(Kohlberg; 1973, p. 47) between ego stages and moral stages:
"Ego 'stages' Moral stages
Ascribed identities accepted Conventional morality
Identity crisis or moratorium Traditional or
'retrogressed* relativism 
Identity achievement Principled morality"
There is a further implication in the relationship of the two theories 
Kohlberg (1967) sees moral development "as a progressive movement toward 
basing moral judgement on concepts of justice" (Kohlberg; 1967, p. 173) 
just as Piaget (1932) views heteronomous, as opposed to autonomous, 
societies as those which attempt to impose a supposed truth on individuals
A study of the development of race attitudes is strengthened if the 
development of moral judgement in terms of the concept of justice, is 
examined. Studies of race attitudes have almost invariably been forced 
to examine the growth of identity in the child as an integral part of 
his race attitudes. Thus although Erikson himself has explained the 
formation of negative identity in individuals, it is through the 
application of a cognitive developmental approach to moral development 
that the maintenance of prejudiced racial attitudes in terms of 
identity development can be examined. At the same time theories of 
moral development account for an individual's acceptance of authori­
tarian systems and provide a framework in w h . :h to examine how race 
attitudes develop.
3.2.1. Piaget
According to Piaget (1932), a child at the heteronomous stage of 
moral development is egocentric, that is, he views the world as fused 
with his own perception of reality. He is also characterized by realism, 
subjective and objective phenomena are confused. In terms of moral 
realism, such a child regards rules as unchangeable and absolute and 
judges these rules according to the physical consequences of an act 
rather than its intentions. These three dimensions have been found to 
exist in American and French-speaking cultures, as have the heteronomous 
dimensions of definition of wrong by punishment, expiative as opposed 
to restitutive justice, and immanent justice. All these dimensions demand 
a cognitive set in which the child is unable to separate physical and 
biological laws from adult-madi laws. Laws exist independently of the 
child and independently of circumstance or intention - thus judgements 
concerning punishment are fairly simple. It is only through cooperative 
activity that the child comes to understand the purpose of rules which 
are not independent of himself. Yet this stage in Piaget's theory
lacks empirical supnort : reciprocity and peer orientation "do not ap­
pear to be 'genuine' developmental dimensions" (Kohlberg; 1963, p. 319). 
As these two dimensions are essential for the development of an auton­
omous individual it appears that Piaget fails to provide evidence of 
the cognitive development essential for the autonomous stage. He 
views this development in terms of the falling away of egocentrism and 
the ability to view reality from the perspective of other individuals. 
Kohlberg (1963) found that such mutual cooperation does not lead to 
reciprocity. Reciprocity, according to Kohlberg (1963) is "associated 
with lack of respect for adult authority, but not with peer-group 
participation" (p. 320).
Although Kohlberg has questioned the crux of Piaget's theory, namely 
that a sense of justice develops from a solidarity among children them­
selves , Piaget (1932) also maintains that a complex society will foster 
the development of such solidarity. Ki ilberg (1963) validly criticizes 
Piaget's assumption that a sense of justice is a product of a certain 
stage, yet Piaget did qualify his stages by the assertion that con­
formist societies will tend to be heteronomous and will encourage the 
development of dimensions such as constraint or expiative justice. Thus 
an authoritarian society will be less likely to produce autonomous 
indiv'^- Is than a democratic society as in the former, mutual cooper­
ation discouraged. Piaget's theory does have the validity of placing 
the emergence of an autonomous stage in a larger social context, and 
perhaps this explains why, in fact, research has failed to find "a 
positive relationship between peer-group participation and an orien­
tation to reciprocity" (Kohlberg; 1963, p. 320). A truly democratic 
society would produce more evidence of such a relationship, while 
negative and authoritarian societies would foster an objective, or non- 
cooperative sense of responsibility.
3.2.2. Kohlberg
Kohlberg (1973) maintains that aspects of moral development are a 
reaction to the whole social world and not merely a product of a 
certain stage. He sees each stage as representing a more adequate 
conception of the social system and the developing ability to think 
more abstractly. At the sam? time he examines the relationship of 
ego-development to moral development. Just as the cognitive-learning 
of sex-role concepts is related to value judgements consistent with 
self-conceptual identity, so too can the cognitive-learning of concepts 
such as race be related to the development of morality and identity. 
Kohlberg (1966) states that "the curvilinear age development of moralist 
sex-role stereotypes is probably quite similar to the more thoroughly 
studied development of moralist racial stereotypes" (p. 123). Thus 
if a tendency exists to equate the self with the good, then the racial 
group to which one belongs is also perceived of as good. The fact 
that at the ages of three or four the child is already able to value his 
own gender-identity positively in terms of sex-role stereotypes, lends 
weight to the finding that children of four years old already begin to 
express race attitudes (Goodman, 1964), An explanation in terms of cog­
nitive balance explains the tendency to judge what is equated as part 
of the self as good - thus children will value positively people of the 
same racial group as themselves, as being an extension of their selves.
A negative identity develops when the child values the self as good, 
but society negates that belief and portrays aspects of the child's 
self (such as skin colour) negatively.
Competence motivation (White, 1959), a concept Kohlberg (1966) 
used to help explain the adoption of sex-role stereotypes, is also an 
explanation for the acceptance of racial stereotypes. Since in a 
white-dominated society, white is conceived of as good, children, both
white and black, will be motivated to identify with what is good. This 
conformity will in turn be conceived of as moral, as being part of the 
socio-moral order of society. Conformity leads to the conventional 
level of Kohlberg*s stages, to an acceptance of the rules of authority, 
but it is Kohlberg's (1966, 1973) intention to account for the develop­
ment of post-conventional morality in adults, as this is where he found 
Piaget's theory to be at fault.
Smith (1969) and Haan, Smith and Block (1968) found that the ma­
jority of students involved in sit-ins at the University of California, 
Berkeley,were at the post-conventional level of morality while only 
twelve percent of non-protesters had reached that level. Kohlberg (in 
Keniston, 1970) found that a high level of moral development does not 
lean naturally to participation in public protests and sought to explain 
adult moral development in terms of Erikson's theory of ego-identity :
"Our reasoning is that the movement from conventional 
to principled morality was one which must be con­
sidered as a matter of personal choice and as a 
choice of a self in a sense which was not true of 
earlier moral stages. Accordingly, it might be 
hypothesized that an Eriksonian 'identity crisis' 
and its resolution might be a necessary part of 
this movement" (Kohlberg; 1973, p. 47).
Kohlberg (1973) found that in fact people who remain at the conventional 
level of moral development, and who have never experienced an "identity 
crisis" lack both ego and moral progression. In a study conducted by 
Podd (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971) two-thirds of the principled sub­
jects had an "identity achievement status". Kohlberg and Gilligan
(1971) conclude from this that "to have questioned conventional 
morality you must have questioned your identity as well, though vou may 
continue to hold a conventional moral position after having done so’’. 
(Kohlberg and Gilligan; 1971, p. 1078). Thus the emergence of the post- 
conventional level correlates with the individual achieving ego-identity, 
in other words, perceiving himself in relation to, and independent of, a
given socio-moral order. Kohlberg (1973) prefers the notion of choice 
in Erikson's stages (that is, the movement of the self is dependent on 
the self’s choices) to Piaget's more static notion of stages of perception 
of the world. By basing his theory on the former, while still main­
taining the cognitive approach of the latter, Kohlberg has attempted 
to synthesize the affective and cognitive aspects of moral development.
It can be concluded then, that the adolescent choice, in Erikaonian 
terms identity versus role "-con fusion, is a moral one. Kohlberg (1971, 
1973) perceives of moral development as the widening of role-taking 
opportunities. While at stage three of the conventional level, the 
child begins to orientate himself towards the mutuality of interpersonal 
relations. Should he, however, be presented with differing groups and 
conflicting expectations, the individual can yield "to an identifying 
with one system which is seen as overarching and adequate" (Duska and 
Whelan; 1977. p. 64). This is the "law and order" orientation of stage 
four, a stage when the individual has his identity in society confirmed 
by conforming to the moral order of society. It is this stage that 
allows for the perpetuation of authoritarian systems. Kohlberg (1973) 
states that cognitive maturity is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition, for moral judgement maturity. Only when the individual 
undergoes an "identity crisis", in other words, when his perception of 
himself conflicts with society's conception of his role, can he progress 
morally towards the post-conventional level of moral judgement - an 
ability to see what "ought" to be, and not acceptance of what "is".
Kohlberg's theory of moral development provides the basis for the 
development of race attitudes in young children, conformity to racial 
stereotypes, and in older children, the inability to identify the self 
in terms of higher levels of moral judgement. Kohlberg (1971) found 
only ten percent of American urban middle-class males aged twenty-four
to have reached the personal principles stage. Because individuals fa 
to separate themselves from the socio-moral order, a system can be per­
petuated for generations. It is an atmosphere of acceptance of the 
socio-moral order that characterizes middle-class Americans, a fact 
vhich can perhaps explain the racial prejudice still rampant in such a
CHAPTER 4
Empirical Findings
The theoretical issues discussed in the previous chapters elucidate 
the developmental stages of the child which could account for the deve­
lopment of race attitudes and race consciousness in children. Although 
Kohlberg (1971) has investigated the relationship of moral stages to 
ideology, race attitudes research has not relied on theoretical postu­
lates to confirm empirical findings. Thus, for example, Goodman (1964) 
found that at the age of two, children are conscious of their own and 
others' racial characteristics. Stevenson and Stewart (1958) confirm 
this finding and maintain that by the age of four to six, children are 
already aware of the stereotyped roles assigned to Negroes. The 
discussion of Kohlberg * s theory of moral development has already pointed 
to the early development of stereotype awareness in children. Erikson ’s
ego-identity theory can be applied similarly to Cla’k's (1955) finding 
that for Negro children, most often the recipients of racial prejudice, 
self-identification in terms of skin colour is entrenched at ages five 
to eight. The following review uf empirical research will attempt to 
establish where possible the relationship between experimental findings 
and theoretical issues. While the cognitive and affective growth of 
the child in terms of ego-identity and moral development has been 
discussed, empirical research focuses on those societal influences 
responsible for aiding such growth.
4.1. Determinants of racial attitudes
There is no single determining factor responsible for the develop­
ment of racial attitudes in children. There is no conclusive evidence
45.
to prove that parents are responsible for transmitting attitudes to 
their children : while Freud (1973) believes in early childhood intro- 
jections of parental authority figures (the formation of the superego), 
Erikson (1965, 1968) and Kohlberg (1973) see a wider configuration of 
societal influences as being responsible for attitude formation. These 
environmental influences will be reviewed below.
4 1.1. I’arental Influences
There has been some evidence ro show that a more rigid and authori­
tarian upbringing will produce a more prejudiced child (Frenkel-Brunswik, 
1947, 1948; Adorno et al., 1950). Frenkel-Brunswik (1947 - 194C) found 
that prejudiced children manifest similar personality traits to their 
parents, but in a less rigid form. She found that racial attitudes 
were strongly developed in children of eleven years of age when children 
should have developed the sense of cooperation that Piaget (1932) sees 
as essential for the development of autonomous moral judgement. But
children such as those in the Frenkel-Brunswik studies (1947 ~ 1948) had 
not attained such autonomy. Frenkel-Brunswik (1950) stipulates the 
kind uf environment likely to produce a prejudiced child ; parents of 
such children create an environment of submission in which the child is 
brought up in a highly conventional manner. Concepts of "good"' and 
"bad" are interpreted in terms of social conformity and the child is
unable to develop an ego-identity independent of his parents wishes :
"The lack of an internalized and individualized approach
to the child, on the part of the parents, as well as a 
tendency to transmit mainly a set of conventional rules 
and customs, may be considered as interfering with the 
development of a clear-cut personal identity in the 
growing child" (Frenkel-Brunswik; 1950, p. 385).
In terms of Erikson's theory, if the child must accept the roles out­
lined for him by his parents and thus by society, his own ego-identity 
development suffers. His moral judgement, according to Piaget (1932)
and Kohlberg (1971, 1973), would retain a conventional respect for, and 
obedience to, authorit> figures. Frenkel-Brunswik (1950) found that 
parents with less desire to conform to societal norms produced more 
tolerant children with a richer emotional life and a greater indepen­
dence from their parents. Such children would hence become more 
autonomous in their moral judgements, and would be more questioning of 
their own role in society. Frenkel-Brunswik (1950) found prejudiced 
individuals to be lacking in personal insight, a finding which supports 
Kohlberg*s assumption that an "identity-crisis" is necessary for 
principled moral reasoning.
Clark (1955) found that Negro children often develop racial attitudes 
quite disparate to those of their parents. Clark and Clark (1939) found 
that children in a mixed nursery-school develop a consciousness of self 
in terms of racial identific ion at much later stage than do children in 
segregated nursery-schools. These findings stress that it is not 
necessarily parental attitudes that are. responsible for racial attitudes 
towards the self and towards others. Clark and Clark (1939) point out 
that
"... the physical characteristics of individuals making 
up the environment for the developing child seems at 
present sufficient to change markedly the orientation 
of the dynamics of self-awareness and racial identifi­
cation as found in a study of segregated Negro 
children" (Clark and Ciark, 1939, p. 163) .
Thus regard less of his parent’s racial attitudes, the Negro child will
develop attitudes that reflect society's attitudes towards him : "...the
fact that young Negro children would prefer to be white reflects their
knowledge that society prefers white people" (Clark; 1955, p. 24). This
statement parallels Erikson’s (1965) postulate that in order to confirm
his ego-identity a child will develop a negative identity that allows
for continuity between his own self-conception and society's conception
In an influential and important longitudinal study, Trager and 
Yarrow *.1952) tried to assess the extent to which parents influence 
their children's racial attitudes. They interviewed one hundred and 
one families to see whether parents could accept the racial attitudes 
inherent in their children's experience. They found that most parents, 
both Negro and White, firstly did not have an adequate understanding of 
cultural differences and could not impart such knowledge to their 
children, and secondly were themselves emotionally confused in areas 
concerning race and religion and were thus unable to develop pnsitive 
social and emotional coping mechanisms for race problems in their 
children. Trager and Yarrow (1952) as opposed to the Frenkel-Brunswik 
(1950) finding, found that in fact many children expressed greater 
hostility towards another group than did their parents. They con­
cluded that no parent-child c&use-effect relationship could be postu­
lated but that a marked similarity did exist between the racial 
attitudes of parents and their children. They found that parent1’ had 
litcle or no understanding of the dynamics of prejudice and suggest a 
programme of parent education to help parents understand their own 
racial attitudes.
Black patents are able to foresee the problems which their 
children will have to face and often postpone mentioning racial prob­
lems to their children (Clark, 1955). Clark (1955) suggests that 
when the social forces responsible for racial stereotypes are broken, 
the cycle which gives rise to conflict and anxiety in the parent and 
child alike, will disintegrate.The black child has a problem of self- 
identification and group belongingness in a multi-racial society in 
which he is unable to participate fully.
A general pattern of racial response is common to white children: 
children reject blacks in terms o' racial stereotypes regardless of
48.
the amount of contact they actually have with black children; there is 
a clow increase in prejudice with age, however, prejudiced attitudes 
become more firmly established, they do not change qualitatively : black 
children show a less rapid increase in racial attitudes towards white 
children; there are no sex differences in racial responses and often 
group identification is part of the development of ego-identity (Trager 
and Yarrow, 1952). This pattern develops in the child as other social 
attitudes are formed - conformity is rewarded and the child is supported 
by his group (be it peers or parents) : "these acquired patterns of 
social and racial ideas are interrelated both in development and in 
function" (Clark; 1955, p. 23). In studies of the development of a 
national attitude, children based their preference on "liking" - yet 
liking associated with one's own national group. For white children 
their social reality seems to reinforce their own group while for black 
children the same social reality results in a negative portrayal of his 
race. Trager and Yarrow's (1952) findings support Erikson's theory of 
ego-identity.
4.1.2. Social _influences
Racial symbols in the environment are directly responsiole for the 
growth of acial attitudes. Pettigrew (1958) found that authori­
tarianism was not specifically related to prejudiced beliefs which were a 
product of environmental pressures towards conformity. Thus in South 
Africa, apartheid is an institutionalized form of racism which legally 
enforces the segregation of black and white children. There if very 
little contact between the two groups on a mutual basis. Unlike in 
America and Britain where the media has o ften been responsible for 
fostering racial stereotypes (Hartmann and Husband, 1974 ; Milner, 1975) , 
in South Africa the child's reality is one of prejudiced racial atti­
tudes. Such a "pseudo-species" (Erikson, 1968) results in the forma­
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tion of a number of ego-identity possibilities : white children can 
conform to the general values of the dominant group to which they 
belong and remain at a conventional stage of morality. Alternatively 
white adolescents can choose to question the established system and risk 
ostracism from the social order. An "identity-crisis" (Erikson, 1968) 
ensues which can result in a high level of post-conventional morality 
and a belief in the concept of justice, or in acceptance of the roles 
prescribed to him by his society. The black child too has a choice 
He can either develop a negative identity by accepting society's 
definition of his minority status in terms of skin colour, or he can 
reject such a definition and develop a positive ego-identity in terms 
of a strong group consciousness. Hraba and Grant (1970) found that a 
multi-racial environment resulted in a strong positive self-consciousness 
among black children which included an acceptance of white children. As 
Clark (1955) states : "The measure of a social injustice is its conse­
quence in the lives of human beings" (Clark; 1955, p. 37), and this 
consequence is seen especially in South Africa uhere the policy of edu­
cational segregation resulted in one of the major social conflicts in 
South African history, and one centred on the education of black 
children (Soweto, June, 1976) .
Group membership, an important factor in the development of racial 
attitudes, is directly related to the weight given to a certain group by 
society :
"The role of group membership in the concept of self 
varies with the psychological position of each 
group in society. This position may be such as to 
increase or to decrease the importance of the 
specific group membership for the individual"
(Trager and Yarrow; 1952, p. 117).
In studies involving the Clark Doll test, there is a greater tendency
for black children to identify with the most socially prestigious pvoup
(Clark and Clark, 1947; Radke and Tracer, 1950; Goodman, 1957;
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Stevenson and Stewart, 1958; Landreth and Johnson, 1957; Norland, 1962). 
Coopersmith (1975) found that when in the company of mainly black 
children. Blacks regarded themselves more favourably than did black 
children in a predominantly white environment. However when white 
children are in the minority they still consistently favour white 
children and hold prejudiced attitudes against blacks (Rosncr, 1954) . 
Horowitz (1935-1936) found that white children who could not have 
participated in racial discrimination "displayed prejudice in imagined 
activities in which they were too young to participate in reality"
(Horowitz; 1935-1936, p. 31).
4.1.3. Cultural influences
Embedded in the artifacts of a majority culture, is evidence of 
racial prejudice. In literature the connotations of the words "black" 
and "white" have evolved into social stereotypes. The "Black is
beautiful" movement is surely a linguistic as well as a social revolution.
The French structuralist movement (Roland Barthes, 1977; Christian Metz, 
1976)has investigated the extent to which a code dominates a person's 
thought structures. Constant exposure to denotative assumptions such as 
white symbolizing purity, imprint upon a person an order of thought which 
he in turn reproduces. Aspects of the media such as film or television 
which have only shown blacks in menial, subservient roles, or children's 
books which completely exclude pictures of black children, have all 
helped to create a code whereby the mere word black has several negative 
connotations.
This is borne out by a technique called the Semantic. Differential, 
developed by Osgood (1952). Williams, Norland and Underwood (1970) using 
the Semantic Differential, investigated the values attached to certain 
colours and found that "white" was consistently associated with "good" 
while "black" connotated "bad". They also found that the evaluative
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technique used by white subjects to arrive at the black-bad association 
^as similar to the way in which they evaluated black people. Renniger 
and Williams (1966) found that children of five years of age showed a 
high knowledge of the negative connotations of the word black. Renniger 
and Williams (1966) warn against the danger such connotations can hold 
for a young child who can develop a simplified framework from which to 
pass racial judgements.
Milner (1975) has investigated the influence of cultural factors such 
as comics on the development of racial attitudes. He found comics to 
abound in stereotyped jargon. Different cultural groups are referred 
to by derogatory terminology. Many comics centre around "us" and 
"them" themes which help in fostering an in-group mentality. He con­
cludes that comics
"encourage outdated and dangerously hostile views of 
foreign nations; and non-white peoples are largely 
omitted from comics, and derogated in their few 
appearances. ... Their present treatment of black 
people can only foster ignorance and divisivemss 
in a multi-racial society" (Milner; 1975, p. 73).
The important point to note, however, is that the media is a product of
a certain society and it is society that fosters the code ascribed to by
cultural artifacts.
It is also the dominant culture that usually imposes its will or. a 
mnority culture. In South Afiica, where the majority is actually 
ascribed the status of a minority group, Soweto schoolchildren in June,
1976, rejected the imposition of an educational system (Bantu education) 
especially created for them by the dominant white group. They demanded 
the right to the same educational system as white children. Black
writers such as James Baldwin have dismissed the role cast upon them by
the dominant culture : speaking to Margaret Mead, Baldwin (1971) said •
"... you i e identified with the angels, .'.id I'm 
identii; d \ lth the devil" (p. 228). ... It's
difficult ti be born... and difficult to live
for everybody, everywhere, forever. But no one 
has a right to put on top of that another 
burden, another burden which nobody can pay, 
and a burden which really nobody can bear"
(Baldwin; 1970, p. 256).
Similarly, Soweto school-children in South Africa tried to reject such a
burden.
4.2. Self-concept research
Self-concept research is hampered by serious methodological problems 
centering around large variations in firstly, definitions of self- 
concept, secondly instruments used to measure self-concept, and thirdly 
faults in research designs (Zirkel, 1971). About fifteen different 
definitions of self-concept exist, all of which relate to a number of 
different theories. Thus Erikson's theorv of ego-identity might yield 
many operational definitions such as self-esteem, self-worth or self- 
image. Often, self-concept instruments lack standardization, validity 
and reliability. Research designs make it difficult to compare 
differences in self-concepts between black and white children. For 
example the impact of being white in a white society does not have the 
same effect on self-concept a: being black in a white society might hcve. 
In fact, studies have found that self-concept is a much more important 
aspect of personality development in black children than it is in white 
children (Shannon, 1973).
Another problem in self-concept research arises when attempting to 
compare recent studies of self-concept with studies conducted in the 1940 
to 1960 period. Given the importance of environmental factors such as 
the socio-political order for identity development, a comparative expo­
sition of self-concept research must take into account changing social 
systems. Thus while Clark and Clark (1939, 1947) found, using the Clark 
Doll Test, that black as well as white children rejected black dolls in 
favour of white dolls, the same experiment conducted in 1966 and 1970
(Gregor and McPherson, 1966; Hraba and Grant, 1970) found that black and 
white children preferred the dolls of their own racial group. This is 
an indication of the changing self-concept of black children in response 
to changes in the status of Blacks in American society. Lessing (in 
Reece, 1974) suggests that the black power movement has been partially 
responsible for a more positive self-image among black children, Powell 
(in Reece, 1974) studying the self-concept of Northern and Southern 
American students, concluded that a united black community providing 
strong black adult models could help in the development of high positive 
self-concepts, a finding confirmed by Beglis and Sheikh (1974). It is 
logical to assume that an oppressive society will have an effect on the 
self-concept of black children if they are members of the oppressed 
group. This is suggested by Erikson's theory of ego-identity. Shannon 
(1973) states that to "negate the degree to which racism affects the 
atmosphere in which Blacks develop...is ludicrous" (Shannon; 1973, p.
519). Current research indicates that an atmosphere of black assertive­
ness is conducive to the development of a positive self-concept in black 
children.
A further difficulty in comparing the self-concepts of black and 
white children lies in the lack of stabilizing differences in socio­
economic status. In addition many studies fail to take such differences 
into account. Differences between self-concepts in black and white 
children in Long and Henderson's (1968) study might be accounted for in 
terms of the socio-economic difference in the subjects' backgrounds. 
Similarly the race of the experimenter might have an effect on self- 
concept results. This is Cotnam's (1969) finding, but is refuted by 
Raymer's (1969) study on experimental effects on Negro and white subjects.
Kvaraceus (1965) has suggested that the self-concept per se can be 
used for the "reeducation of Negro youth" (p. 1). Perhaps more important 
is the e ff e c t  of bicultural education on the self-concepts of both black
and white children; the latter are often more secure and more unquestioning 
of their ego-identity. Kohlberg (1973) has criticized such security as
hampering moral development. A discussion of the importance of edu­
cational institutions in changing the racial attitudes and ego-identity 
of black and white children will form part of the following chapter.
CHAPTER 5
.Race attitudes and education
Repeatedly, studies of racial attitudes and ego-identity focus on 
the school as the agent to change, for example, prejudiced attitudes or 
negative self-concepts. Yet just as psychology has been responsible 
for the scientific, sanction of misguided race relations research, so 
has education in the fullest sense of the word, been used to perpetuate 
myths concerning the educability of many black and white poor children.
It is these myths that will be examined below.
5.1. The cult of the disadvantaged child
The general premise underlying research into disadvantaged children 
could be summed up by Deutsch's (1963) statement that "generally the 
combination of circumstances in middle-class life is considerably more 
likely to furnish opportunities f . normal growth of the child" (Deutsch; 
1963, p. 164). What does Deutsch mean by che "normal growth of the 
child"? Does he mean the cognitive development of the child in terms of 
the progressive development of cognitive structures enabling him to cope 
with his environment, or does he mean the recognized skills that the 
middle-class school demands from the child? Deutsch (1963) in fact 
adopts the social pathology model of behaviour and intelligence. The 
environment of the Negro or the lower-class child is considered lacking 
in those facets that enable the child to develop proper cognitive skills. 
The facets put forward as potential ly retarding forces are, a mother 
who is unable to provide her child with the necessary language ability 
required for success in school, and an impoverished environment, or one 
that "deviates from the normative system defined by the white middle- 
class" (Baratz and Barttz; 1970, p. 32).
The ;.> pathology model derives from a misconception of the 
meaning of poverty. In his book Culture and Poverty Valentine (1968) 
defines poverty as comparative and relative. Above all though, he 
points out that as ''a quality... the condition of being poor does have 
a central significance : the essence of poverty is inequality" (Valentine 
1968, p. 13). He views the poor as disadvantaged in respect to 
"occupations, education, and political power" (p. 14) and points out 
the contradiction of American society which has equality as the basis 
of its ideological valve system. Yet it is just such a contradiction 
that leads to the . 1 pathology model which, paradoxically, denies
cultural differences b) attempting to raise the lower-class child to a 
middle-class standard. Raratz and Baratz (1970) mention that pro­
ponents of the social pathology model are careful not to postulate the 
existence of cultural differences for fear of being branded supporters 
of the genetic model which postulates inherent racial differences. 
Instead, followers of the social pathology model adopt what Valentine
(1968) calls "an intellectual fad cf attributing a 'culture' or 'sub­
culture' to almost any social category" (p. 15). It is under such a 
fad that the lower-class child is labelled "disadvantaged" or "deprived", 
which he might be economically, but which he is not, necessarily, in 
terms of his cognitive functioning. The use of words sue',, as "deprived" 
have lost their original, economic meaning :
"... the 'culture ot poverty' may distract attention 
from crucial structural characteristics of the 
stratified social system as a whole and focus it 
instead on alleged motivational peculiarities of the 
poor that are of doubtful validity or relevance"
(Valentine; 1968, pp. 16-17).
Valentine (1968) validly states that the "culture of poverty" concept 
will only "perpetuate the disadvantages associated with the poor" (p.
17). The school is one of the institutions responsible for the per­
petuation of those facets which lead to the label of the lower-class
child as "disadvantaged".
The first assun. tion of the social pathology model is that "one's 
linguistic competence is a measure of one's intellectual capacity" 
(Baratz and Baratz; 1970, p. 33). While the theoretical implication 
of this statement is an argument in itself (the language-thought 
controversy), what is assumed by researchers (Bernstein, 1961; Deutsch, 
1963; Bereiter and Englemann, 1966; Hunt, 1968) is that Negro 
parents provide poor linguistic models for their children. Conse­
quently these children do not develop the necessary communication 
skills for social interaction. Baratz and Baratz (1970) point out 
that the basis of such a view is that standard English is necessarily 
correct, and that non-standard English is less complex, deficient and 
inferior. Alternative findings produce contradictory results. Labov 
et al. (1968) examined Negro language as an independent system. They 
found ’"hat "while the lower-class Negro child has a somewhat distinctive 
form ui speech, it is not impoverished, illogical, syntactically 
primitive or semantically empty" (Ginsburg; 1972, p.90). An example of 
a cultural linguistic difference open to misunderstanding in the school 
situation is the Spanish phrase "the bus missed me" as onposed to the 
English "1 missed the bus" (Slaughter, 1969). Without the knowledge of 
che Spanish implication, teachers could cause untold difficulties 
by demanding punctuality from a Spanish child.
Related to findings of the inadequate language skills of the lower- 
class child is the assumption that the child lives in a disorganized 
environment which fails to provide him with a sense of time and con­
tinuity. Continuity with the environment is regarded as essential for 
the development of ego-identity (Erikson, 1965), but the disorganization 
of the environment can hardly be said to result in distortions of time, 
conceptualizations of time being, like language, a cultural phenomenon.
The lower-class mother is accused of not providing a stimulating environ 
ment for the child, thereby retarding his cognitive growth. Yet as 
Feuerstein (1972) states, "the term ’cultural deprivation' may occur... 
in the uppermost socio-economic echelon of the ascendant society" (.p. 3) 
Cognitive dysfunction can occur in a middle-class environment just as it 
found among some lower-class children. It results in an impairment of 
some area of learning, and was thought to be a result of perceptual 
problems (Bruner, 1966). Cognitive dysfunction in learning disabled 
children often results in difficulties in concept formation, altnough 
Meltzer (1976) found that on Piagetian measures of conservation, there 
was no difference in the performances of normal and learning disabled 
children. Thus the area of cognitive dysfunction forms a separate and 
complex problem of its own and one that is not specifically related to 
the environmental conditions surrounding the child. Lower-class 
children develop language, and hence commun'cative, skills and maternal 
teaching takes place albeit not as it does in a middle-class environment 
Baratz and Baratz (1970) state that
"what makes f_a lower-class child^ appear 'uneducable' 
is his failure in an educational system that is in­
sensitive to the culturally different linguistic and 
cognitive styles that he brings to the classroom 
setting. The school, therefore, fails to use the 
child's distinct cultural patterns as the vehicle for 
teaching new skills and additional cultural styles"
(Baratz and Baratz; 1970, p. 39).
5.2. The failure of early intervention progi .mmos
Many early intervention programmes operate on the social pathology 
model discussed above. They attempt to provide impoverished environ­
ments with those assets considered necessary for "normal growth". The 
failure of many such programmes resulted from assessment with tools 
designed for use with middle-class children,(the problem of assessing 
the "disadvantaged child" is discussed by Feuerstein, 1972) and inter­
vention in terms of middle-class norms. The cause of pathology is
59.
attributed to the black American, and not to American society as a 
whole. This is akin to "blaming poverty on the poor" (Valentine; 1968, 
p. 15). The initial three month intervention of the Head Start 
programme was ineffective, and thus the programme was extended to a pre­
school year. The logical conclusion was to continually increase inter­
vention in order to offset the effects of the deprived environment,until 
such programmes started to interfere with the actual family unit of the 
lower-class child. The basic premise was to change existing modes of 
life in the lower-class environment, instead tf concentrating on the 
social system that created such an environment. Ironically the logical 
extension of the widening of the scope of intervention programmes was 
the dismissal of such programmes altogether, and the postulation instead, 
°f a genetic model of individual differences.
Such a model accounts for the failure of early intervention pro­
grammes as follows :
"'...genetic aberration, clearly identifiable under the 
microscope... has quite specific consequences on cog­
nitive processes. Such specific intellectual 
deficiencies are thus entirely possible without there 
being any specific environmental deprivations needed 
to account for them" (Jensen; 1969, p. 32)
and "intelligence variation has a large genetic component..." (Jensen; 
1969, p. 82). In spite of its condemnation of environmental influences, 
the genetic model employs the sama postulate as the social pathology 
model, namely that the lower-class child lacks certain cognitive skills. 
The work of Jensen (1969) in this regard relies heavily on the intelli­
gence quotient as a measure of assessing the child's capabilities. He 
places much faith in the value of intelligence testing as a means of 
evaluating the child's intelligence, and explains differences in I.Q. 
scores in terms of "heritabiity". In other words, genetic differences 
are thought to be instruou ital in producing I.Q. differences. Jensen
(1969) extends this thesis to an explanation of differences in I.Q.
scores between Negro and white children in terms of genetic variations.
The "Jensen controversy", as it became known, has been logically and 
experimentally refuted. Logical inconsistencies in Jensen's argument 
stem from his trust in the I.Q. phenomenon. Traditional I.Q. tools 
are biased towards the middle-class child, and the test situation, 
expirirenter-bias and so on are all known to have a significant effect 
on the outcome of I.Q. test results. Empirically, strong environ­
mental influences have been found to affect I.Q. scores (Kagan, 1969; 
Deutsch, 1969; Ginsburg, 1972 Watson, 1973), as opposed to merely 
genetic influences.
Jensen's theory has thus been firmly discredited, however its 
implications have been damaging and far-reaching. A letter to the 
Harvard Educational Review in which Jtnsen's article was first published, 
condemns Jensen's theory for its "white intellectual superiority" 
approach. Brazziel (1969) states : "It will help not one bit for Jensen 
or the HER ^Harvard EducationalReviewj editorial board to protest 
that they did not intend for Jensen's article to be used in this way" 
(Brazziel; 1969, p. 349). The fact is that Jensen gives scientific 
support to all those prejudiced people who believe in the inherent 
inferiority of the Blacks. Brazziel (1969) suggests that Jensen should 
perhaps examine the role of racism on differences between Blacks and 
Whites. Jensen (1969) has merely institutionalized a social scientific 
form of racism. Deutsch (1969) rejects Jensen's "racist hypothesis"
(p. 525) and points out that his article is an "invitation to mis­
understanding" (Deutsch; 1969, p. 526). This misunderstanding extends 
to the school situation.
5.3. Schools and poor children
A poor child's I.Q, score is used as a stigma throughout his school 
life. The general pattern of intelligence test scores for a Harlem
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Jensen's theory has thus been firmly discredited, however its 
implications have been damaging and far-reaching. A letter to the 
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condemns Jensen's theory for its "white intellectual superiority" 
approach. Brazziel (1969) states : "It will help not one bit for Jensen 
ot the HER ^Harvard Educational Review^ editorial board to protest 
that they did not intend for Jensen's article to be used in this way" 
(Brazziel; 1969, p. 349). The fact is that Jensen gives scientific 
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(p. 525) and points out that his article is an "invitation to mis­
understanding" (Deutsch; 1969, p. 526). This misunderstanding extends 
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5.3. Schools and poor children
A poor child's I.Q. score is used as a stigma throughout his school 
life. The general pattern of intelligence test scores for a Harlem
school child is one of progressive deterioration which parallels a de­
crease in levels of academic performance (Clark, 1965). Clark (1965) 
compared these findings with the performance of New York City pupils 
who show an increase in I.Q. scores through school. He concludes that 
"these findings strongly suggest that for Harlem pupils I.Q. tests 
reflect the quality of teaching and the resulting educational achieve­
ment more than intellectual potential" (Clark; 1965, p. 121). Ginsburg 
(1972) has also postulated that "schools for poor children are not 
functioning properly" (p. 1) and regards the failure among poor children 
at school as due to an educational system geared towards a white middle- 
class child. Koch (1970), rat’.er than viewing the school as a medium 
for change, sees it as one element ir. the constant denial of oppor­
tunities to black children. He rejects the use of the word dis­
advantaged as a term used to detract from the actual agents of a "dis­
advantaged" or poor environment :
"The words deprived and disadvantaged may be thought 
to apply to poor children’s imagination and their 
power to create things, and they do not. The tragedy 
- and for a teacher, the hope and opportunity - is 
not that children lack imagination, but that it has 
been repressed and depressed, among other places at 
schools..." (Koch, n Ginsburg; 1^72, preface) .
The misinterpretation of the causal fac: >rs for black children's failure
in school led to a crisis in American education in the late 1960's when
black leaders protcsteJ about inadequate educational opportunities for
black children.
Teacher attitudes and school policy can deny poor children non- 
discriminatory education. Milner (1975) points out that teachers often 
view black children as what now appears to be a caricature of the 
"typical lower-class child", a child inferior in most respects to a 
white middle-class child and one of whom little is expected by a way 
of educational achievement, This "self-fulfilling prophecy"
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(Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968), when children start to behave as 
expected of them by the teacher, has been shown to depress the actual 
performance of lower-class children. by discriminating egainst him 
the teacher can reinforce the. minority child's status in the classroom 
and lower his potential for achievement in an academic environment. The 
tendency to stream pupils according to their performance often results 
in the segregation of middle-class and lower-class children into 
different classrooms thus effectively preventing a poor child from 
rising in the educational hierarchy.
An important factor then in promoting multi-cultural education is 
to introduce a teacher education programme whereby teachers are made to 
confront the stereotypes they hold of minority group children. Black 
children are aware of the social implications of their group member­
ship and their self-image can be reinforced by the teacher's low level 
of expectation from their grc*f. In a programme designed to change 
children's attitudes, Trager and Radke-Yarrow (1952) investigated the 
effect of teachers' values on children as they viewed "the teachers' 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and her willingness to change" (p. 
355) as essential to curriculum improvement and attitude change in 
white and black children.
The use of discriminatory teaching material is basic to discrimi­
nation in education. Few teaching aids reflect the multi-cultural 
society in which they are used. In South Africa, a history text.
The British Commonwealth and Empire by M. Masefield states that "...in 
South Africa, where the white man's safety and welfare must be safe­
guarded, it is not easy to give Africans equal rights and responsibility" 
(Masefield, in Kuya; 1974, p.210). Children's literature in which black 
people are portrayed reflects a preoccupation with colonial-type stereo­
types. The black child is presented with a derogatory picture of his
group, if, in fact, black people are included in the literature at all. 
Books such as Little Black Sambo are still included in the British
school's reading programmes, often in order to expose children to the
portrayal of black figures (Milner,1975). The Doctor Dolittle books use 
insulting racial terminology and are widely read by most white children. 
Many school-readers (such as the Ladybird series) ofx, r children 
situations of unreality by propagating an ordered middle-class world 
of happiness, Milner (1975) states that "this semi-detached and sports- 
jacket world is irrelevant to working class children, let alone black 
children' (Milner; 1975, p. 227). That such literature is offensive 
and discriminatory should serve as encouragement for the production 
of multi-racial books for use in a multi-racial society. Litcher and 
Johnson (1969) presented a group of white children with "multi-ethnic" 
readers. They found that there was a significant decrease in pre­
judicial attitudes towards Negroes after a four month exposure to such 
books. Si *1arly a group of Harlem adolescents who were given extra 
curriculum lessons in black history, demonstrated a more positive self- 
image after the four month course (Johnson, 1966).
5.4. Moral education and educational change
Kohlberg (1972) has applied his theory of moral development to 
moral education. The basic question concerning moral education is 
whether there exists a universal valuo-system that all children should 
develop. Given the existence of culturally universal stages of moral 
development, Kohlberg (1972) believes that it is possible to present a 
philosophical and psychological theory of moral education. The possi­
bility of moral education revolves around the fact that moral develop­
ment can be stimulated by modes of thinking and problem-solving.
Just as stages of moral development are conceived of as being culturally 
universal, so moral education involves "a set of rational principles of
judgement and decision valid for every culture, the principles of human 
welfare and justice" (Kohlberg; 1972, p. 14). Kohlberg (1972) thus 
places justice at the centre of the school's xole in me al education.
He suggests that schools plan moral education discussions which generate 
cognitive conflict. It is the teacher's duty to help the child resolve 
such conflicts. Yet as Kohlberg '’1972) states : "at present, the 
schools themselves are not especially moral institutions. Insti­
tutional relationships tend to be based more on authority than on ideas 
of justice?’(Kohlberg; 1972, p. 16). Similarly, schools are not models 
of institutions freed of racial prejudice. If "the teaching of justice 
requires just schools" (Kohlberg; 1970, p. 38), then it follows that 
just schools can help in the development of just children. Radke, 
Trager and Davis (1949) found that multi-racial contact per se did not 
reduce prejudice between black and white children and concluded that 
contact is not the only means of eradicating prejudice. Changes in 
educational policy and school curricula are potential agents of change 
of race attitudes in children. If a normative theory of racial pre­
judice is adopted then it is the norms of society that are largely 
responsible for the development of race attitudes and to change these, 
normative institutions must be scrutinized. Milner (1975) suggests bi- 
cultural education for "tolerance"• Baratz and Baratz (1970) also 
suggest that the aims of educational change "should be to produce a 
bicultural child who is capable of functioning both in his subculture 
and in the mainstream" (Baratz and Baratz; 1970, p. 73). The final, 
and most important word comes from Milner (1975) who cautions that
"what is quite wrong is to see education as a panacea; to see it as a 
substitute for action against discrimination and institutional racism 
in the wider society" (Milner; 1975, p. 212). Nothing must detract 
from the realization that racism is a phenomenon which must be attacked 
at its roots, however ingrained these are in societal networks.
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CHAPTER 6
Race attitudes in the South African context
The one special feature distinguishing iacv attitudes research in 
South Africa from similar research ir countries such as America or 
Britain, is that multi-racial South Africa is a separate society in which 
apartheid is legally sanctioned. While, as Mann (1971) points out,
South Africa is a "perfect laboratory" (p. 51) for studies of race 
attitudes, such studies must take cognizance of the historical and social 
forces that are operant in the formation of racial attitudes in South 
Africa. Mann (1971) draws attention to the fact that race attitudes 
are part of the social fabric of the South African way of life. They 
are responsible for the perpetuation and continuation of the policy of 
apartheid and any attempt to change such attitudes necessitates an 
examination o f  the forces that created them. MacCrone (1937) found the 
historical beginning of racial prejudice in South Africa in the laager­
like frontier society of the eighteenth century. Just how ingrained
these attitudes have become is shown in a study on racial attitudes by 
Pettigrew (1965) . He found that in South Africa, as in the Southern 
parts of the United States, prejudice against Blacks does not correlate 
with authoritarian personality traits. Pettigrew (1965) concludes that 
"conformity to South African... mores is associated with racial in­
tolerance, while deviance from these mores is associated with racial 
tolerance" (Pettigrew; 1965, p. 40). Thus racial prejudice is a norm 
in South Africa, and in terms of Kohlberg*s theory of moral development, 
the majority of the dominant group will conform to the authority em­
bodying the norm.
6.1. Education in South Africa
On June 16th, 1976, school children in Soweto, a Black township out­
side Johannesburg, protested against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction in Black schools. Since that date seventy-one percent of 
Soweto school teachers have resigned and there has been a fifty percent 
decrease in school attendance (Rand Daily Mail, 1979) . In comparison, 
school children in white schools have had an uninterrupted period of 
education. The Soweto riots, while being a product of apartheid
policies, also highlight the problems of a segregated educational system
in which the minority white group enjoys compulsory education, as 
opposed to the then non-compuisory "Bantu Education" for Black children.
Malherbe (1977) stales that this isolationist policy of segregated 
education began in 1936 with the growth of Afrikanerdom and in the 
"course of time served to generate stereotype attitudes not only in 
regard to Engligh-Afrikaans relationships but also on ideological 
issues involving Black-White relationships..." (Malherbe; 1977, p. 48). 
Malherbe (1970) examined the attitudes of white children to other 
language groups and found that those attending multilingual schools 
were far less hostile to other language groups than th'~e children 
attending unilingual schools. A similar result could be expected for 
children attending racially segregated schools . Schlemmer (1974) found 
that Afrikaaners under the age of 25 had no sense of urgency in coming 
to terms with South Africa's racial problems. Malherbe (1977) maintains 
that deliberate educational segregation will only make children "less 
adaptable in meeting new challenges due to changing circumstances" (p.48).
The premises of Bantu Education were laid out in the Eiselin Commission 
report of 1951. Despite the report’s acknowledgement of the "extreme 
aversion" Blacks had to "any education specially adapted for the Bantu" 
(Horrel ; 1968, p. 5), the Commission recommended a separate Bantu
education system to train the child in "Bantu culture". The rationale 
behind the system was to dampen any aspirations Blacks might have had 
towards the. opportunities provided by education. The introduction of 
"Bantu Education" led to a boycott of black schools on the Vitwatersrand 
and the Eastern Cape in 1955.
The differences between black and white educational facilities are 
pinpointed by a few facts. Government expenditure on black pupils was 
R42-00 in 1975-1976, as compared to R644-00 spent on each white pupil. 
Teacher shortage in black high schools in 1975 was one hundred a*-3 forty- 
three percent with black teachers earning forty-six percent of the 
salaries that white teachers in similar posts earn (Kane-Berman; 1978,
p. 187). It was such an educational climate that led to the Soweto 
riots of 1976 which were sparked off directly by the enforced teaching 
of at least two subjects in Afrikaans. The riots were also an 
expression of a "Psychological liberation... enabling Blacks to purge 
themselves of negative conceptions of themselves... and replace them 
with positive self-awareness" (Kane-Berman; 1978, p. 103). A detailed 
sociological, as opposed to psychological, background to the Soweto 
riots can be found in Kane-Beman's (1978) book Soweto, Black revolt 
WTiite reaction.
6.2. Race attitude research in South Africa.
It is this socio-political climate that makes the study of race 
attitudes and identity so important in South Africa today. Virtually no 
mutual contact exists between young black and white school children, and 
as these children grow older their roles uecorae those of dominant white 
and oppressed black. The objectivity of race relations research in 
South Africa diminishes if one views a part of that research as being 
action-oriented, or designed to change existing attitudes. In South Africa, 
studies of race attitudes in children have revealed an early racial 
preference for Whites on the part of black and white children (Gregor and
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McPherson, 1966; Meij, 1966; Melamed, 1967). The preference is re­
inforced by a segregated educational system which perpetuates racial 
stereotypes. Lever (1972) measured changes in the racial attitudes of 
students after a four-year period. He managed to reduce the social 
distance between Whites and Blacks. Malherbe (1946) also reports a 
change in the attitudes of army servicemen after a series of lectures and 
discussions. Mann (1971) criticizes the non-representative samples of 
many race attitude studies in South Africa, for example Pettigrew (1958), 
McCrone (1947) and Lever (1972) used mainly university students as their 
subjects. McCrone (1947) does suggest that further research should 
examine "what role is played by this ready-made real-life bogey jjBlacktTj 
in the psychology of the young £whit^| child..." (McCrone; 1947, p. 86). 
The present study attempts to examine this role, while also attempting 
to assess whether a new self-consciousness has emerged amongst black 
children, in spite of the continuing oppress ion of the existing apartheid 
system.
CHAPTER 7
Experimental method
The effects of a multi-racial media programme on black and white 
children were measured in terms of racial attitudes and ego-identity.
This chapter will involve a discussion of the experimental design perti­
nent to a pre- posttest study, as well as a description of the sample 
and the tests used to assess racial attitudes and ego-identity. Scoring 
and testing procedures will also be outlined.
7.1. Design
The study was based on a four group before-after design called 
Solomon's design after its innovator R. Solomon (1949). A simple, two 
group before-after design does not enable the experimenter to assess 
firstly, the effects of pretesting on posttest results, and secondly, the 
effects of contemporaneous factors which could occur between the pre- and 
posttesting. Since this study actually attempted to assess the effects 
of an intervention programme on children's attitudes, it was necessary 
to determine that other factors were not in fact responsible for post­
test results. Solomon's design has the following advantages : it en­
ables the experimenter to "assess the interaction of the experimental 
testing with the experimental treatment" (Solomon and Lessac; 1968, p. 
146); it is the minimum design necessary for a developmental study in­
volving an intervention procedure in that pretesting a control group 
"enhances the developmental influences of its normal environment"
(Solomon and Lessac; 1968, p. 147); Solomon's design also enables 
experimental results to be interpreted in ttnns of absolute observations 
as well as relative ones while a traditional two group design is only 
capable of producing relative statements.
The four group design operates in the following manner : both 
experimental and control groups are divided randomly in half : one half 
of each group is pretested, while all the subjects of the four groups 
are posttested. In this study half of the experimental groups (one black
group and one white group) were pretested, as were their corresponding
control groups. All subjects were posttested. This is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
The Four Group Design for an Intervention 
Programme with Two Experimental Groups and 
Two Control Groups
Groups E.grp. I C.grp. I E.grp.II C.grp. II
Sub-Groups A B C  D A  B C  D
Pretested X X X X
Intervention X X  X X
Posttested X X X  X X  X X  X
Table I demonstrates that in this study the four group design is du­
plicated, as two experimental and two control groups exist. Thus not 
only does each experimental group have a corresponding control group, but 
control is also built into the specific design from which statistical 
inferences are made. One can, for example, compare the effects of the 
intervention programme on the experimental group that was not contaminated 
by pretesting, with the group that did receive pretesting. On another 
level, by comparing control and experimental posttest results the effect 
of the intervention programme, as opposed to natural developmental phenom­
ena, can be assessed. At the same time this study sought to examine the 
differences in racial attitudes and ego-identity between black and white 
children. The design enables the experimenter to compare pretest and 
posttest results for both experimental groups and both control groups. 
Solomon's design yields numerous experimental, as well as statistical,
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possibilities : for example, it is possible for the control groups 
to improve, while the experimental groups deteriorate after the 
intervention programme. Alternatively control group scores 
could remain static, and experimental scores deteriorate; or 
both experimental and control groups could improve. Campbell 
(1957) has stated that Solomon's design presents a new ideal for 
social scientists. Randomization leads to statistical equivalence 
of groups, and history and maturation are controlled for.
The major problem with this design is how to determine one's 
overall statistical tactic, as for each step in the design a 
different statistical technique could be used. Solomon (1949) 
recommends a 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance; however, this 
study involves two experimental groups, and a multiple analysis of 
variance technique was used.
7.2. Subjects
One of the aims of this investigation was to examine the racial at­
titudes of young South Africans, and to see whether it was possible, in 
a prejudiced climate to change the negative racial attitudes of children. 
Thus eighty, seven to eight year old black and white children were 
selected for this study. At this period in their development children 
should be passing from the Eriksonian stage of initiative versus guilt to 
that of industry versus inferiority. In the former stage children base 
their identifications on ideal adults (such as teachers), while in the 
latter stage, the environment of the child can threaten his sense of 
identity - thus the child becomes conscious of the colour of his skin, or 
of his background (Erikson; 1965, p. 252). The child of this age 
group (seven to eight years old) is generally characterized by Piaget's 
heteronomy and moral realism - the child will usually submit to the rules 
of outside authority. After eight years of age children start to develop
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moral autonomy. In terms of Kohlberg's stages, the child is centred 
around stage one of moral reasoning - children will judge as good that 
which is similar to themselves. Age thus formed the basis of the 
selection of subjects.
Two experimental and two control groups (that is, one black ex­
perimental and control group, and one white experimental and control 
group) were used. As it was impossible to control for the socio­
economic background of subjects (see Table 2), children were selected 
only if their scores on the Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1956) 
fell within the average range for "observation and clear thinking"
(Raven; 1965, p. 1). All eighty children obtained between 5G and 90 
percentile points on the Coloured Progressive Matrices, this representing 
the average to above average range. The backgrounds, home language and 
religions of the children differed widely; and although both white 
and black children attended private schools, the black children were 
selected from a parochial urban school, while the white children came from 
a private school in a middle-class environment. Table 2 represents a 
breakdown of the socio-economic differences of the subjects.
TABLE 2
Socio-economic backgrounds of Forty White 
and Forty Black Children
SE category. Professional Managerial Skilled Unskilled
Blacks
Whites
0 0 6 34
21 15 4 0
Of the eighty children, 34 were males, 46 females, this representing 
a fairly even distribution between sexes. The South African group 
classification system makes it necessary to explain what, in this study, 
is meant by a "black" child. The South African legal system classifies
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people as White, Coloured, Asian or African. Although the subjects in 
the study would, under such a system consist of forty Whites and forty 
Africans, the contemporary word, the generic "black" is a more universal 
and acceptable terr stemming from the ideology of black consciousness.
In sum, the sample consisted of forty white children and forty black 
children with a mean age of 7 year 7 months. The latter were mainly 
from a lower socio-economic background; the former came from middle to 
upper-middle class environments. Religions backgrounds were varied, 
black children being predominantly Catholic, white children coming from 
several different religious denominations White children had English 
as their home language, black children spoke either Zvlu (27 Ss) or Sotho 
(13 Ss) . All subjects scored between 50 and 90 percentile plints on the 
Coloured Progressive Matrices, and this served as a form of matching within- 
and between-groups.
7.3. Description of tests and scoring procedures
The following tests were used to measure racial attitudes in children: 
the Clark Doll Test (Clark and Clark, 1940); the "Show me" test (Horowitz 
and Horowitz, 1938) and the Categories Test (Horowitz and Horowitz, 1938). 
Ego-identity was measured by the Colouring-in Test (Clark and Clark, 1940) , 
the Clark Doll Test (Self-Identification) (Clark and Clark, 1940) and the 
"Where are you Game" (Engel and Raine, 1963).
The Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1956) served as a test of 
observation and clear thinking. It was especially designed for use with 
young children and is easily applied to people who have little or no 
command of the English language. For this reason it was particularly 
suited to this stud” as not all subjects were fluent in English. As its 
name implies, the Coloured Progressive Matrices enables the child to de­
velop a pattern of thought as he progresses from relatively easy items to 
more difficult ones. It is thus not a test of general intelligence, but 
rather one of logical thought processes.
74.
7.3.1. Clark Poll Test
This test forms the basis of most race attitude studies with children.
Its usefulness lies in the simple nature of the task which the child must 
perform : he must merely indicate his preference, in answer to a number of
questions, for one of the differently coloured dolls in front of him. Yet
this apparently straight-forward test has been subject to some criticism 
(for example, Katz and Zalk, 1974) : first of all, no reliability or validity 
data exists for the test. Different experimenters use different dolls and 
often obtain different results. A forced-choice technique which forces a 
child to choose one particular doll, can result in different answers to 
those obtained using another method such as an open-ended interview.
Lerner and Buehrig (1975) found less prejudice using this latter technique.
A second criticism listed by Katz and Zalk (1974) is that the Clark Doll
Test confounds skin colour with other cues. Yet as the test is designed
to elicit responses in terms of skin colour, a child choosing a do?1 on 
any other basis might reveal less prejudice by his very choice. This 
is the aim of the Clark Doll Test. If s child is provided with con­
sistent cues among the dolls, his preferences should reveal what he is 
in fact responding to. The actual test situation can have a strong 
influence on children's answers; for example, a child might choose dolls 
that correspond to his own and his examiner's race, should they be of the 
same race. Katz and Zalk(1974) found that children actually said little 
about colour when asked to explain their choices. This might also have 
been in response to the examiner's race, or to the implications, for the 
child, of the total test situation. Thus the test must be seen as part 
of a situation in which many factors operate to influence the child's 
response.
In this study children were presented with four six-inch, unclothed, 
female dolls - two black dolls and two white dolls. All dolls had short hair
and fairly similar features. Subjects were required to answer the 
following questions : show me the doll that (1) you would like to nlay
with; (2) you like best; (3) is a nice doll; (4) has a nice colour;
(5) 1 joks naughty.
The range of possible scores, in terms of a score of favourableness 
towards Blacks/Whites, was 0.5. Thus for each other-race preference, 
subjects obtained a score of one.
This test was also used as a measure of self-identification. Child­
ren were asked to identify the doll that looked like a white child, a 
black child and like themselves. The latter question presented an 
interesting possibility as all the dolls used resembled females. Males 
thus had to make a clearly defined racial choice while females could 
respond more easily to the features of each doll. Nevertheless the 
purpose of the test was to determine whether each child was firstly able 
to distinguish black from white, and secondly, whether or not he identified 
himself in racial terms. The range of possible scores was 0-3.
7.3.2. "Show me" Test
Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) revised the original "Show me" test 
constructed by Horowitz (1936) in order to enable children to make un­
favourable as well as favourable selections from sixteen photographic 
portraits. In its revised form, the "Show me" test also enabled the 
experimenter to compare race attitudes with sex attitudes using one 
instrument. Horowitz and Hcrowitz (1938) used the test to provide 
supportive evidence from findings derived from the use of the Categories 
Test and a forced-choice interview, and found the "Show me" test to be a 
more "refined" (p. 312) instrument for the study of sex and race atti­
tudes. Although the same criticism of lack of reliability and validity 
can be applied to this test, it has a very important advantage over many 
rigourously standardized psychometric tests : while the structure of the 
test remains constant, content can be changed to provide contemporary and
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country-specific portrait pictures. Thus the test need not become out­
dated and visually meaning]ess. Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) state that 
differences in objective research findings on racial attitudes in child­
ren are due, not to the lack of test validity, but to geographical 
differences between samples.
In the investigation the E used tweive pictures of
black and white children, as well as three pictures of non-South Africans 
and one picture of a cat. The inclusion of the three non-South Africans 
served to assess children’s reactions to unfamiliar faces (pictures were 
of one Japanese girl and two Mexican boys), while the inclusion of the 
cat enabled children to vent whatever unfavourable feelings they might 
have on an inocuous and neutral creature. In terms of Erikson's theory 
of ego-identity, the "Show me" test could predict that children would 
respond positively to familiar faces of the same race. Sixteen black 
and white photographs, appioximately all 10 x 10 cm., were mounted on a 
large piece of white cardboard measuring 62 x 62 cm. Portraits consisted
of eight boys and seven girls (see Appendix 1). Subjects were asked the 
following questions : Show ma who (1) you would like to sit next to at
school; (2) you would like to play with; (3) comes from a poor home;
(4) you do not want in your school; (5) you would like to have as your
cousin; (6) looks stupid; (7) you do not like.
Subjects received one point for other-race responses to questions 1,
2 and 5 and one point for same-race responses to questions 3 , 4 , 6  and 
7. The latter four questions are designed to tap negative racial 
attitudes. All pctr?' showed only children's faces yet prior know­
ledge could affect ■ jCct's responses. For example, within the South 
African context black children generally do come from poorer homes than 
do white children, and question 3 must be. examined in conduction with 
the child's other responses - that is, if the child shows favourable
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other-race attitudes and scores question 3 as other-race, this might be 
an accurate appraisal of the social system in which the child lives. The 
range of possible scores was 0-7.
7.3.3. Categories Test
This test was designed by Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) to determine 
the relative strength of socio-economic, race, sex and age categories 
for children. It was based on a subtest used in standard verbal intelli­
gence batteries, in which the child is required to select the item that 
"does not belong" from five words. The nature of this task was trans­
ferred to the Categories Test in a pictorial form : children are required 
to reject a picture that does not belong in a series of five pictures.
The selection of items in the Categories Test is such that the child's 
structuring of the social world can be examined. Thus, for example, one 
task might consist of four females and one male; but only three of the 
females plus the male will be black, while the remaining female will he 
white. The child can either make a choice in terms of race (choosing 
the white female) or sex (choosing the male). The child's own perception 
of the underlying pattern in each task is assessed. Horowitz and Horowitz 
(1938) found that children rarely made a response in terms of some other 
variable such as the position or quality of the picture. A reverse 
form of the Categories Test has been designed by Landreth and Johnson 
(1953). Their Picture and Inset Test demands that children select a 
black, brown or white person to complete a picture containing another 
black, brown or white person. This test also makes it possible to 
compare children's race, age or sex responses.
In this study, only age versus race and sex versus race were 
examined. For each category children were given two practice tasks in 
which the race variable was excluded. Subjects were thus mentally 
prepared for non-racial choices in the actual test. Each category
measured contained four tasks. Thus the age versus race category 
consisted of four 50 x 13 cm, strips of cardboard with five portraits 
mounted on each, $s did the sex versur race category (see Appendix !). 
Photographic portraits of black and vhite South Africans were selected 
from newspapers and magazines.
Scoring consisted of giving one point to each response made in terms 
of age or sex. This indicated that the child made a non-racial judgement 
in terms of the pictures that "did not belong". The range of possible 
scores was 0-8.
A total race attitudes score, in terms of other-race favourableness 
was obtained by summing the final scores of the Clark Doll Test, the 
"Show-me" test and the Categories Test. The range for the total score 
was thus 0-20.
7.3.4. Colouring-in Test
The aim of this test is to measure firstly children's colour concepts, 
and secondly their ego-identity in terms of how they identify themselves 
racially and how they would like to be identified. Erikson (1965) 
states that ego-identity cannot be attained until the individual perceives 
an inner consistency between his identity and society’s perception of his 
identity. If, at the ages of seven and eight, the child desires to be 
another skin colour, he has already reached a "crisis" in terms of who 
he is, who he would like to be, and his perception of society’s reaction 
to either his actual, or his real, self. Such a crisis, Erikson (1968) 
states, can be resolved by the formation of a negative self-identity.
This deceptively simple Colouring-in task designed by Clark and Clark 
(1940) can thus be used to examine the early formation of ego-identity 
in children.
Each child was given a sheet consisting of five line drawings of a 
leaf, an apple, a pig and two clothed children corresponding to the
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subject’s race and sex (see Appendix 1). Children were required to colour-
in the three objects the colour they are in nature. In this way the
subject's ability to relate a colour to a particular object was
assessed. Children were then asked to colour-in the first child the
colour of themselves and the second child any colour they would like to 
be. Subjects were given a box of sixty-four wax crayons in order to 
present them with as wide a range of colour choices as possible.
Colouring-in was examined in terms of : (1) correct colour-object 
match; (2) correct racial self-identification; (3) the second child
coloured the same colour as the first child; (4) a clear light-dark/ 
dark-light dichotomy between the first and second child; (5) imaginative 
choice of colour for second child. Subjects received a point for 1, 2,
3 and 5 above, the range thus being 0-4.
7.3.5. "Where are you game"
The problems of operationalizing a concept such as ego-identity have 
been discussed in Chapter 4. The Colouring-in test described above 
probably lends itself more readily to an Eriksonian interpretation than 
do many self-concept tests. Nevertheless the latter, used in con­
junction with the former, can help to measure the self-concept of the 
child with which certain identifications are made. Engel and Raine's 
(1963) "Where are you game" is a self-concept test designed to be as 
enjoyable and unthreatening to the ego-integration of the child as 
possible. The test consists of seven five-point vertical ladders, each 
ladder representing seven bi-polar, positive-negative dimensions construed 
as important in the child's self-concept. The following seven dimensions 
were used (Engel and Raine, 1963) : (1) intellectually gifted-lacking 
these capacities; (2) happy-unhappy; (3) popular-unpopular; (4) brave- 
frightened; ( 5 )  attractive-unattractive; (6) strong-weak; (7) obedient- 
disobedient . For each dimension the E drew a stick figure to represent,
for example, a "happy" child and an "unhappy" child, and then explained 
what the middle three lines represented. The subject then had to 
decide on which step of the ladder he would place himself (see Appendix 1).
Each child could score a maximum of 35 points, in other words 5 
points per dimension, 5 representing the top rung of the ladder and 1 
the bottom rung. The range of possible scores was 7-35.
A total ego-identity score was obtained by summing final scores on 
the Clark Doll Test (self-identification), the Colouring-in test, and 
the "Where are you game", the range becoming 7-42.
7.4. Multi-racial media programme material
The selection of material for the multi-racial media intervention 
programme was based on Milner's (1975) statement that material must 
portray Blacks and Whites as "individuals doing ordinary, unremarkable 
things, displaying the normal range of human characteristics" (Milner;
1975, p. 218). Selection was also based on the findings of two 
previous studies : Litcher and Johnson (1969) used multi-ethnic readers 
over a four month period in ar attempt to change the racial attitudes of 
second-grade white American schoolchildren. Their material was designed 
to "portray Negroes in a positive way, contradicting prevailing prejudices 
and stereotypes" (Litcher and Johnson; 1969, p.148). Controversial material 
is subject to "celective perception and recall" Levine and Murphy; '.943, 
p. 515), in other words a person will generally remember material which 
supports his social attitudes rather than conflicts with these attitudes. 
Alternatively such material is ignored. Litcher and Johnson (1969) found 
a dramatic increase in favourable attitudes towards Negroes after using 
multi-ethnic readers and in a further four week investigation with another 
group of children, attempted to ascertain what it was in the pictures of 
the multi-ethnic readers that created a positive change in attitudes. 
Litcher, Johnson and Ryan (1973) presented two experimental groups with
0
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pictures of multi-racial contact - the first group received pictures of 
children in middle-class settings, while the second group used material 
of children in lower-class settings. Control group children used the 
normal school curriculum. Litcher, Johnson and Ryan (1973) found no 
improvement in children's racial attitudes. This was either due to the 
short time-period of the study, or to the ineffectiveness of exposure to 
multi-ethnic pictures. The experimenters warn that where multi-racial, 
mutual contact is minimal, multi-ethnic pictures might be inadequate for 
the complex task of changing racial attitudes.
In this study the intervention programme took place over a two-month 
period. Twelve multi-racial books were used (see Appendix 2). These 
were translated from English to Sothu fcr use with the black experimental 
group. The books were incorporated into the personal reading programme 
of both experimental groups, while control group children continued to 
use normal school readers in which no multi-racial contact occurred.
Books were suited to a range of seven to eight year old reading skills 
and showed children in various multi-racial situations. Multi-racial 
material was not limited to books. Experimental group children were 
asked to participate in a project called "People of the world" in which 
they were presented with numerous magazine pictures of black and white 
people from many different countries. They were requested to stick 
pictures of those people they liked on three 62 x 62 cm. pieces of white 
cardboard. This exercise was designed to actively involve children in a 
multi-racial project. Subjects were shown a film about the American 
children's television series "Sesame Street" which included multi-racial 
contact amongst children. Subjects also listened to a Sesame Street 
record.
While the experimental group received visual and auditory stimuli 
requiring their active participation, control group subject were exposed
to their regular school curricula. The intervention programme was thus 
designed to change the racial attitudes and ego-identity of black and 
white school-children. Multi-racial contact showed children of different 
races in mutual cooperation with one another. No derogatory or stereo­
typed material was included in the programme.
7.5. Testing procedure
To begin with, biographical information was obtained about the back­
ground of S£ in terms of father's occupation, religion, age and sex. Ss. 
were then individually tested on the Coloured Progressive Matrices and 
remained in the study if their scores fell between 50 and 90 percentile 
points.
Ss were divided randomly into groups to be either pre- and post­
tested or only post-tested and were then individually tested on the 
measures of racial attitudes and ego-identity described above. White 
children were tested by the author while black children were tested by a 
black E. After spending a few minutes establishing rapport with Ss, the 
I£ explained to them that they would be asked a few questions to which there 
were no right or wrong answers, only S£ thoughts about themselves and other 
people. The test material was sufficiently interesting to motivate 
subjects to participate in the study.
Testing took place in one session with a ten minute interval between 
tests of race attitudes and tests of ego-identity. During this break Ss^  
were encouraged to talk about the pictures in the "Show me" test. Ss 
comments were recorded by the E . S_s_ were tested with the "Show me" test, 
Clark Doll Test and Categories Test in that order. Testing took place 
at a small table in an empty school room. The "Show me" test was placed 
against the back of a chair and Ss were encouraged to examine the pictures 
for as long as they liked before answering questions. The black and white 
dolls were placed on the table in front of Ss as was the Categories Test.
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Ss were first required to do practice tasks for the Categories Test and
then one by one, were shown the sex versus race, and the age versus race,
tasks. The E noted Ss^  responses on a race attitude answer sheet(see Appendix 3).
After the ten minute break, subject and moved to another table for 
the ego-identity tests. ^s answered the self-concept test first, 
followed by the Clark Doll Test (self-identification) and the Colouring- 
in test. The Colouring-in test was given last in order to enable jSs to 
spend as much time as they desired in choosing colours from a box of sixty- 
four crayons. The order of test presentation was consistent for pre- 
and post-test groups.
The multi-racial intev Qntion programme was implemented so as not to 
interfere with the normal functioning of classes. A week after the 
pretesting, multi-racial books were given vO teachers to introduce into 
the personal reading programme of experimental groups. Ss were re­
quired to look at a minimum of one book a week. In fact 90% of S[s read 
all twelve books at least once. The "People of the World" project was 
explained to Ss by their teachers. About 70% of Ss. participated in 
this project in their spare time. All viewed the "Sesame Street" 
film shown to them by the and heard the "Sesame Street" record. A 
week elapsed after the end of the programme and the start of posttesting.
Testing sessions varied in length as Sjs were free to spend as much 
time as they required on each test. The average length of testing 
sessions was about thirty minutes. All tests were scored by the author 
and an independent rater. Inter-rater reliability was determined by 
means of the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. Table 3 
indicates that inter-rater reliability was significant at the .01 and .001 
levels. Agreement between raters is sufficiently high to allow for an 
interpretation of results based on the above scoring procedures.
TABLE 3
Inter-Rater Reliability Coefficients for 
Tests of Racial Attitudes and Ego-Identity
Test r Signif. Level
Clark Doll Test .92 .001
Clark Doll Test (Self-ldent.) .83 .001
"Show me" Test .88 .001
Categories Test 1.00 .001
Colouring-In Test .81 . 01
"Where are you Game" 1.00 .001
CHAPTER 8 
Results
8 1. Statistical analysis
Multivariate and univariate, analyses of variance were used to test 
the hypotheses that (1) a multi-racial media programme would change the 
racial attitudes of black and white children; (2) white children would 
have more positive self-concepts than black children before the programme 
and (3) there would be change in the self-concepts of black children 
after the programme. In addition the effect of pretesting on posttest 
results was examined. The Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient 
was used to examine the relationship between racial attitudes and ego- 
identity.
As a first step the descriptive statisti s means, standard deviations 
and ranges were calculated for all groups for ego-idcntity and race atti­
tude scores. These are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 below.
TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations and Ranges for Race
Attitude Scores
B L A C K W H 1 T E
Ti eatment Control Treatment Control
Pro Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Group 
Pre-posttest M 11.60 11.00 13.40 15.50 10.30 13.60 12.30 11.20
SD (3.51) (3.13) (2.95) (2.37) (3.61) (2.91) (4.14) (3.16)
Range (6-17) (6-16) (10-19)(12-19) (6-16) (9-17) (7-19) (9-17)
Posttest M 10.80 10.90 10.90 11 .00
SD (3.85) (2.33) (3.78) (2.88)
Range (3-16) (6-14) (5-17) (6-15)
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TABLE 2
Means, Standard Deviations and Ranges for Ego-Identity Scores
B L A C K W H I T E
Treatment Control Treatment Control
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Group
Pre-posttest M 35.20 34.20 31.80 33.30 35.00 32.30 34.00 31.80
SD (3.60) (3.12) (6.97) (4.98) (4.82) (3.13) (4.99) (4 81)
Range (27-38) (29-39) (19-40) (25-40) (28-41) (28-37) (27-39) (29-41
Posttest M 34.20 35.90 33.00 32.50
SD (4. J) (3.54) (5.68) (4.54)
Range (29-41) (29-41) (23-41) (27-41)
Table 1 shows that the highest pretest race attitude mean was obtained 
by the black control group, in other words this group initially obtained 
the highest score for other-race favourableness. This was probably due 
to the selection of a sample of relatively unprejudiced children. Ranges 
indicate higher race attitude scores than for all other groups. When 
posttested this group retained its high mean score. This finding does 
not hold for the group that did not receive pretesting. The white treat­
ment group obtained a higher score after the intervention programme than 
the white control group but this improvement in scores does not hold for 
that half of the white treatment group that did not receive pretesting 
(the post est group). Black and white treatment and control groups all 
show a decrease in mean scores from the pretest condition to the only 
posttest condition. Biack treatment and white control group means de­
creased from the pretest to the (pre) posttest condition. For all 
these groups there was a decline in other-race favourableness over a 
period of three months.
table 2 shows the close similarity of ego-identity means for all 
groups. The black treatment group obtained the highest pretest mean
while the black control group obtained the lowest pretest mean. This, 
again, could be due to sample selection. The black control group was 
the only one to increase its ego-identity scores from the pretest, to the 
posttest and the only-posttest conditions, while all other groups showed 
a slight decrease in mean scores in posttest conditions. Ego-identity 
scores for the only-posttest groups were slightly higher than pre-post­
test means.
TABLE 3
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient for 
Race Attitude and Ego-identity Scores
df r? r Significant Level
118 0.11 -0.33 .05
The Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient was calculated 
for all race attitude and ego-identity scores. Table 3 shows a signi­
ficant negative correlation between racial attitudes and ego-identity.
This indicates that higher race attitude scores (other-race favourable­
ness) are related to lower ego-identity scores. In other words there 
is no one to one correspondence between high race at:itude scores and 
high ego-identity scores ' le 2 shows that the pretest black control
group obtained the lowest ego-identity score, while also obtaining the 
highest race at i ide score (Table 1). Table 3 does indicate that only 
11% (r^ = 0.11) of the variability in ego-identity scores is attribu­
table to the race attitude scores. Thus although a significant relation­
ship was found between race attitude scores and ego-identity scores, 89% 
of the variation in ego-identity scores were due to factors other than 
racial attitudes.
The eff r.ts of race, multi- racial media programme (treatment) and pre­
testing on race attitude and ego-identity scores were analyzed by a 2x2x2
multivariate analysis of variance. 2x2x2 univariate analyses of 
variance were used to analyze race attitude and ego-iuentity scores for 
pre-posttest groups, and pre-posttest and posttest groups.
A multivariate analysis of variance for race attitude and ego- 
identity scores (for the pre-posttest group) yielded no significant race 
effect, F (1,72) = 1.75, p < .05, and no significant pretest effect, F 
(1,72) - 2.56, p < .05. There was a significant main effect for treat­
ment, F (1,72) = 5.74, p < .05, based on Roy's Maximum root criterion 
(see Table 4).
Univariate analyses support the following conclusions:-
a. Race has no significant effect on race attitude and ego-identity 
scores (RA, F = 1.63, df = 1, p < .05, El, F = .16, df = 1, p < .05); 
in other words, on all measures no significant difference was found 
between black and white subjects. This is borne out by the close 
similarity of means in Tables 1 and 2.
b. Treatment has a significant effect on race attitude scores but not
on ego-identity scores (RA, F = 3.62, df = 1, p < .10; El, F = 1.88, 
df = 1, p < .05); this suggests that the multi-racial media pro­
gramme had an effect on race attitudes scores.
c. Pretesting has no significant effect on posttest race attitude and 
ego-identity scores (RA, F =- 1.37, df = 1, p < .05; El, F = 1.08, 
df = 1, p < .05); in terms of Solomon's design the significant 
treatment effect (see b above) for race attitude scores was not due 
to contamination by pretesting.
As the only significant relationship was found on race attitude 
scores for the pre-posttest group, these results will be analyzed in 
detail. Table 4 presents the results of a 2x2x2 analysis of variance of 
equal numbers of the effects of race, treatment and pretesting upon race 
attitude scores.
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TABLE 4
Analysis of Variance for Effects of Three Variables 
on Race Attitude (RA) Scores
Source df MS F
Black-White (A) 1 18.28 1.63
Treat.-Control (B) 1 40.61 3.62+
Pre-Prepost (C) 1 15.31 1.37
AXE 1 59.79 5.33++
AXC 1 1.19 0.11
BXC 1 2.81 0.25
AXBXC 1 61.45 5.48++
Error 72 807.55
p < .10
p < .05
A significant difference was found between the scores of treatment 
and control groups (p < .10). There was a second-order interaction 
cffact of race, treatment and pretesting (p < .05) as well as a first 
order race and intervention effect. These two interaction effects are 
best explained graphically by Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows that the difference between treatment and control groups 
is explained mainly by the difference between the black posttest treatment 
and control means. The black control group shows the most favourable 
race attitudes in both pretest and posttest conditions, while the white 
treatment group shows an increase in race attitude scores from the pre­
test to the posttest condition. Both the black treatment group and the 
white control group show a decrease in race attitude scores. The white 
control group has a larger pretest mean than the white treatment group and 
the latter increased after the intervention programme while the former 
decreased. This suggests that the programme was effective in changing 
the race attitude scores of the white pre-posttest group. However, given
Figure 1
Race Attitude Means to Criterion of Two Treatment (T) 
and Two Control (C) Groups for Pretest and Posttest
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the fact that (a) a treatment-control effect was found only with the pre­
post test groups and not with the pretest and only-posttcst groups; (b) an 
increase in scores after the intervention programme was found only with 
the white treatment group and (c) a second-order interaction effect does 
not preclude the possibility of pretesting affecting posttest scores, 
differences between treatment and control groups can be the result of 
developmental differences in children, and not the result of the inter­
vention programme.
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Figure 2
Race Attitude Means to Criterion of Black and White, 
Treatment and Control Groups for Pretest and Posttest
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Figure 2 shows the difference between treatment ai _ontrol means for 
black and white groups. The figure confirms that the greatest difference 
between means is found between the black treatment and control groups. A 
greater difference exists between black and white control groups than 
exists between black and white treatment groups. Figure 1 shows that the 
former difference is especially large for posttest scores.
8.2. Chi Square Test
In order to assess the significance of answers to questions of the 
"Show me" test, Categories Test and Clark Poll Test, two-tailed chi square
tests for nominal data were conducted for black and white subjects.
8.2.1. "Show me" Test
a. Who would you like to sit next to at school?
X2 = 19.53 df = 3 
This is significant at the .001 level. A significant difference thus
exists between the choices of black and white subjects. Black subjects 
chose to sit next to a black child significantly more often than did 
white subjects who chose the cat more frequently than did black children.
b. Who would you like to play with?
X 2 = 13.50 df = 3 
This is significant at the .01 level. While black and white subjects 
both expressed a desire to play with white children, black subjects chose 
to play with black children significantly more often than white subjects.
c. Who comes from a poor homo?
X 2 = 1 . 0 9  df = 2
No significant difference was found in the responses of black and white 
children to who comes from a poor home. Both groups of children chose 
black and Japanese/Mexican children as coming from poor homes.
d. Who do you want in your school?
X 2 = 18.66 df = 2
This is significant at the .001 level. While black subjects chose mair.ly 
black and Japanese/Mexican children for this question, white subjects 
chose white, and then black children.
e. Who would you like to have as your cousin?
X 2 = 18.305 df = 2 
This is significant at the .001 level. Black subjects chose black 
children significantly more often than white subjects while the latter 
chose Japanese/Mexican children significantly more often than did 
black subjects.
f . Who looks stupid?
X2 = 1.00 df = 2
No significant difference was found in the responses of black and white 
children as to who looks stupid. Both groups of children chose fairly 
evenly white, black and Japanese/Mexican children.
g. Whom do you not like?
X 2 = 2.97 df = 2
No significant difference was found in the responses of black and white 
subjects as to whom they did not like. Both groups of children chose 
evenly amongst the pictures with white subjects choosing more white 
pictures and black subjects choosing more black pictures.
8.2.2. Categories Test
a. Race versus Sex
X 2 = 10.93 df = 2 
This is significant at the .01 level. White subjects tended to make 
significantly more non-racial judgements than did black subjects although 
both groups made more non-racial than racial choices.
b. Race versus Age
X2 * 15.19 df ■= 2
This is significant at the .O ’, level. Again, white subjects made signif 
cantly more non-racial judgement; than black subjects although both groups 
made more non-racial than racial choices.
8.2.3. Clark Doll Test
a. Which doll would you like to play with?
X2 = 2.70 df = 1
This is significant at the .70 level. No significant difference in doll 
choice can be assumed. There was a fairly equal distribution in choice 
of black and white dolls by black and white subjects.
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b. Which doll do you like best?
X2 = 1.21 df = 1
No significant difference was found in the doll choices of black and 
white subjects. Black subjects tended to prefer the white to the 
black doll.
c. Which is a nice doll?
X2 = 16.34 df = 1
This is significant at the .001 level. Black subjects chose the white 
doll significantly more than did white subjects, the latter having a 
fairly even distribution between black and white dolls.
d. Which doll has a nice colour?
X2 ■ 0.54 df = 1
No significant difference exists in the doll choices of black and white 
subjects. Both black and white subjects tended to prefer the white doll 
to the black doll.
e. Which doll looks naughty?
X2 17.73 df = 1
This is significant at the .001 level. Black subjects chose the black 
doll significantly more often than white subjects who showed a fairly 
even distribution between black and white dolls.
No significant difference was found between males and females in 
their choices of black and white dolls (x2 ■ 2.17, df = !, significant 
only at .20 level of significance). There was a fairly even preference 
for black and white dolls between males and females. There was no 
significant difference in the choice of dolls between black and white 
females ( x2 * .86, df = 1). Both black and white females tended to 
choose the white doll more often that the black doll. There was no 
significant difference in the choice of dolls between black and white 
males ( x2 ■ 3.62, df = 1, significant only at. .10 level of signifi­
cance). White males chose the black doll more often than the white doll 
while black males chose the white doll over and above the black doll.
The difference in choice was not, however, significant.
8.3. Conclusion
Hypothesis 1, that the multi-racial media programme would change the 
race attitudes of black and white children, was rejected. Although 
results showed a significant difference between treatment and control 
groups, there was no significant difference between pretest and only-post- 
test , or pretest and posttest groups. Hie black control group and the 
white treatment group were largely responsible for this difference between 
treatment and control groups which was thus not attributable to the multi­
racial media programme but to sample selection.
Hypothesis 2, that white children would have more positive self-con­
cepts than black children before the programme, was rejected. In fact 
the black pretest treatment group had the highest ego-identity mean, this 
being a result of sample selection, but the overall difference between 
black and white ego-identity scores was not significant.
Hypothesis 3, that there would be a change in the self-concept of 
black children after the programme, was not significant. No significant 
change in ego-identity was found, and only the black control group, which 
did not receive the programme, showed an increase in an already high ego- 
identity score. In addition the effect of pretesting on posttest 
results was not significant.
A significant negative correlation was found between racial attitudes 
and ego-identity. Thus an increase in race attitude scores was sig­
nificantly related to a decrease in ego-identity scores. The black 
control group is an example of such a relationship which could also be 
due to sample selection.
Significant i'suits were obtained in an analysis of questions of the
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"Show Tne" test, Categories Test and Clark Doll Test. Black children 
chose to sit next to, play with, and to have as their cousin, black 
children, but did not want some black, and Japanese/Mexican children in 
their school. White children chose to sit next to and to play with, 
white children, to have as their cousin, Japanese/Mexican children, and 
did not want white and then black children in their school.
In the Categories Test, white subjects made significantly more non- 
racial judgements than did black subjects. In the Clark Doll Test black 
children chose the white doll as the "nice" doll and the black doll as 
being "naughty". Where no significance was found this was due to the 
choice of the white doll as preferable by both black and white children.
Chapter 9 will present a discussion of the above results.
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CHAPTER 9 
Discussion
It was the aim of the present study to investigate the effects of 
a multi-racial media programme on the racial attitudes and ego-identity 
of black and white children. Such a programme was found to be ineffec­
tive in changing the existing racial attitudes of both groups of 
children. Both black and white subjects snowed initially positive ego- 
identity scores and these did not change after the intervention programme: 
in other words, contrary to expectations, black children did not have 
lower self-concepts than white children,nor did these change after the 
programme. All three hypotheses were thus rejected. The failure of 
the intervention programme will be discussed first, and then findings 
will be discussed as they relate to the theoretical and social issues 
of this study.
9.1. General discussion of fladings
The premises underlying the intervention programme were that (1) 
both black and white children would hold some form of racial attitudes;
(2) that these were due, in part, to the social sanction of such at­
titudes as well as being a result of lack of equality between races and
(3) a programme designed to show such equality would change negative 
racial attitudes. A possible relationship between ego-identit' and 
racial attitudes was investigated as empirical studies (Horwitz, 1939; 
Clark and Clark, 1939, 1940; Milner, 1975) have alluded to the bearing 
the latter has on the former. In addition, a theorist such as Kohlberg 
(1966, 1971) based his investigations of morality on the work of ego 
psychologists (Erikson) and cognitive developmentali sts (Piaget), and 
suggests a link between the formation of ego-identity and the develop­
ment of morality. Erikson (1978) himself postulates that the develop­
ment of a positive ego-identity is rooted in the social order which
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gives meaning to the individual's attempts at resolving stage crises. 
Equilibrium between the individual and the social order occurs when a 
positive ego-identity unfolds. While Piaget (1932) sees the develop­
ment of a principled morality as possible only under a society of co­
operation and not constraint, Erikson(1966) created the idea of a pseudo- 
species as being responsible for the formation of negative identities.
The latter develop when individuals are forced to conform to the role 
stipulated for them by the pseudo-species. Erikson (1966) maintains 
that out of a collective negative identity, there can emerge a collective 
positive identity which the pseudo-species must recognize. The resultant 
cooperation could result in that "wider identity of mankind" (Erikson: 
1968, p. 265) which is, in a way, a collection of positive identities. 
Piaget (1932), on the other hand, believes that this "morality" of 
justice could occur only in a system of cooperation, a state children 
could maintain were it not for adult rules and sanctions. Kohlberg 
(197 3) believes that it is necessary for an individual to reach an 
"identity crisis" in the fullest sense of the word (that is, a conscious 
awareness of the choice he must make, in Eriksonian terms role confusion 
versus identity) before he can reach the personal principles stage of 
morality.
Thus the theoretical background to this study suggested a link be­
tween racial attitudes and ego-identity whereby the latter would necess­
arily influence the development of the former, both being rooteu in a 
greater socially sanctioned morality. Findings indicate that there is 
a negative relationship between racial attitudes and ego-identity, both 
before and after the intervention programme.
The failure of the intervention programme can be explained by several 
factors : firstly, the programme was implemented for only two months. 
Litcher, Johnson and Ryan (1973) ft and no improvement in children's 
racial attitudes after a short four week period while a three month
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programme resulted in an increase in favourable attitudes towards Negroes 
after the use of only multi-racial readers (Litcher and Johnson. 1Q69). 
Secondly the content of the programme might have been ineffective. Chil­
dren could have responded differently to the controversial material by 
either ignoring it or recognizing it as supporting existing attitudes 
(Levine and Murphy, 1943). Books were not specific to the South African 
social context and showed a world where equal multi-racial contact actually 
does no occur. Litcher, Johnson and Ryan (1973) warn that where multi­
racial contact is minimal, the mere pictorial presentation of such contact 
might be inadequate in changing racial attitudes. In the "Show me" 
test children responded predominantly in terms of past experience : the 
high number of favourable choices for the Japanese girl by white 
ubjecf.s was in fact due to the presence of a Japanese gi-1 in the 
school. Milner (1975) urges that programmes designed to change atti­
tudes should parallel an active attempt to change the conditions that 
produced an injust situation, just as Piaget (1932) postulates that one 
cannot expect the development of a just morality in a society of cons­
traint .
The lack of a positive relationship between cgo-identity and racial 
attitudes, on an experimental level, could be due tc the inadequacy of 
the major determinant of the ego-identity score, the "Where are you game". 
From a range of 7-42 possible ego-identity scores, all groups scored 
between 31.80 and 35.20. Yet an analysis of individual questions of the 
race attitude test, the Clark Doll Test, gives a more detailed account of 
subjects responses. In spite of the high ego-identity score of sck 
m d  white subjects, racial responses to the Clark Doll Test indicate that 
black subjects showed a preference for the white doll significantly more, 
in some cases than white subjects (this finding supports those of 
Clark and Clark; 1939, 1947). While the "Where are you game" Laps
100.
subjects' self-concept, the Clark Doll Test is perhaps an example of a 
measure of both racial attitudes and ego-identity : subjects responded 
either in terms of their awareness of the racial class strata, or in 
terms of their own racial self-consciousness. On the other hand, from 
a range of 0-20 possible race attitude scores, all groups (pre- and 
posttest) scored between 10.30 and 15.50 mean points, the latter score 
actually indicates a positive other-race favourableness mean. In other 
words scores on both race attitude and ego-identity tests could have 
been specific to the sample studied and not representative of a popu­
lation of eight year old children. A biased sample selection, that is, 
children already segregated, could have resulted in a random variation 
of scores. Thus the failure of the multi-racial media programme alac 
testifies to the effect of a social system such as apartheid on young 
children of both races, for given an average, and not definitely 
negative group of scores, existing attitudes did not change - a result 
more likely to be found with strongly prejudiced adults. While the 
effectiveness of the programme is called into question, one might 
speculate on the effect of such a programme on children with extreme 
racial prejudice.
The findings of the study suggest support for Thomas and Silien 
(1972) who view expressions of racial prejudice as consequences and not 
causes of racism. To this end racial prejudice cannot be changed mere­
ly by an intervention programme, but by the eradication < j racism. 
Findings also question the assumption that a positive ego-identity is 
necessarily related to the development of a just morality. Kohlberg's 
(1971, 1973) studies of such a relationship were conducted with adults; 
the present investigation took place with children, who are. likely to 
conform to the stereotypes presented to them as good. Within a develop­
mental framework children cognitively construct their reality (Piaget)
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while developing a psycho-social identity (Kohlberg, 1971). This devel­
opment is dependent on the social reality with which children interact 
and it is this reality that shapes their subsequent moral development.
Given this fact the results of the study become more explicit : white 
children shew a positive ego-identity and express racial attitudes that 
are in accord with their reality; black children show a positive ego- 
identity and express racial attitudes that have resulted, not from the 
reality defined for them by the dominant group, but from their identifi­
cation with the positive elements emerging in their reality. These 
results will be discussed (1) in terms of Erikson's theory of ego-identity 
with especial reference to his conceptualization of the formation of negative 
identities in oppressed peoples; and (2) in terms of the theoretical
relationship between ego-identity, racial attitudes and moral development.
9.2. Theoretical Criticisms
According to Erikson (1968), a positive ego-identity is an expression 
of equilibrium between the individual and the social order. Society re­
inforces "the values by which the ego exists" (Erikson; 1965, p. 269) and 
thus the high ego-identity scores of black and white subjects suggest a 
unity between children and their society. In terns of Erikson’s 
theory of ego-identity, that such a society can produce positive ego- 
identities, is verification for the continuation of the status quo. But 
the question to be asked, with regard to the usefulness of Erikson's 
ego-idc..tity theory for the study of racial attitudes, is what in fact 
the social order has produced in children: do positive ego-idcntities 
in young children justify the status quo in South African society?
Such a society has failed to produce unambivalent children without con­
fusion as to racial norms and individual conscience : subjects in this 
study were perhaps too conscious of the need to make non-racial judge­
ments. This can be seen from the generally unprejudiced responses to
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the "Show me" test, Categories Test and Clark Doll Test. Subjects thus 
showed a definite awareness of the nature of the study. In addition, 
if a pseudo-species such as South African society produces positive ego- 
identities in white subjects, it should, in terms of Erikson (1968) 
produce negative identities in black subjects. This study contradicted 
such an assumption. Disequilibrium between the ego-identity of black 
subjects and the majority social order results in the formation of 
positive identities which are in fact a challenge to the social order.
The fact that the positive ego-identity of white subjects does not go 
hand in hand with high other-race favourableness is evidence of an 
early morality in terms of majority stereotypes. In other words, a 
pseudo-species or society of constraint creates a morality in children 
which conforms to the social norm of such a society. Race attitude 
scores show that white subjects are adapting cognitively to their 
situation. As a functional necessity for cognitive growth they are 
meeting society's demands. Their high ego-identity scores result from 
the confirmation society gives to their adoption of that society's values. 
Were black subjects exposed to, and then to accept those same values, 
hey would in fact develop negative identities by developing an identity 
u c i i u e d  by the dominant group.
Yet black subjects in this study showed positive ego-identities.
On an empirical level, it has been found that the development of black 
consciousness has resulted in positive self-images in black children 
( iraba and Grant, 1970; Reece, 1974). The fact that the adolescent 
crisis of role confusion often occurs earlier in black children is 
evidence of an early racial self-consciousness and the necessity to 
examine in South Africa futu e roles in a society dominated by whites. 
Erikson (1968) has spoken of a "collective recovery" (p.25) among black 
Americans - this is the ability to turn a negative identity into a
collective positive identity which Erikson sees as forming the psycho­
logical core cf the liberation of oppressed people.
Erikson relates identity to ideology and writes of the solidarity 
created by lirking common identities (Erikson; 1967, p. 37). The results 
of this study show no difference between the ego-identities of black and 
white children, and in Eriksonian terras, this confirms the ideological basis 
of identity. Kane-Berman (1979) demonstrates that the 1976 Soweto riots 
led to a positive self-awareness amongst black children. This fact 
necessarily does polarize the ego-idev.tity of white and black children - 
while the former confirms Erikson* s theory (nan cly choices in accord with 
societal values), the letter calls for a revision of Erikson*s ideal 
society. The society responsible for positive ego-identities in white 
children, when challenged, results in positive ego-identities amongst 
black children. Roazen (1976) criticizes Erikson*s acceptance of the 
social order; this study questions the necessity for equilibrium between 
child and society in the formation of ego-identity. The possibility of 
challenging the societal order and still developing a positive ego- 
identity can perhaps best be thought of in terms of Erikson*s conception 
of a "crisis". There exists a "crisis .-.tage" between ego and society in 
which the individual has a choice - either to accept societal "rules" and 
deny the ego its true identity; or to challenge those rules, risk re­
jection by society, yet confirm a true ego-identity. To conceive of 
children having to make such a choice demonstrates the extensive effect 
of an injust societal system.
At the same time such a moral choice does not necessarily equal sub­
sequent moral judgement. Kohlberg (1973) found that individuals who r e ­
cognized the moral choice open to them could still adopt the conventional 
stage of morality by recognizing normative rules as authoritative.
^ohlberg (1973) conceives of moral development as a reaction to the whole 
social world and not just a product of a certain stage of cognitive
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development. It is this fact that links moral development to e g o -  
identity; both are shaped by interaction with society, and moral de­
velopment begins in the early stages of identity-development. As the 
child decenters from Self, he begins to recognize the role others play in 
his environment : this leads to the development of ego-strength as well 
as to the formation of morality. Erikson sees in the development of 
ego-strength the grovlLof a "sense of humanity" (Erikson; 1968, p.402). 
Roazen (1976) criticizes such a conception as an ideal form of develop­
ment and not an actuality. The results of the study suggest the ideal­
istic nature of Erikson*s link between ego-identity and morality. While 
positive ego-identities did not result in other-race favourableness, 
young children have not yet reached the stage of awareness of the Self * s 
choices and thus are not able to judge the moral consequences of thei 
racial attitudes. Erikson (1968) conceives of the child as incor, it ing 
moral rules in the third stage of development (initiative versus guilt) 
and his conscience at this stage is "the ontogenetic cornerstone of 
morality" (Erikson; 1968, p. 119). The results of the study suggest 
hat perhaps conscience is predominantly an adolescent attribute, for both 
Kohlherg (1966) and Piaget (1932) have stated that young children gener­
ally adopt rules without question. It is possibly not human infancy that 
is "the bedrock of ethics" (Roazen; 1976, p. 155) but societal insti­
tutions. Only when the child can separate his ego from the influence of 
others can he develop an autonomous personality, which, for Piaget (1932), 
is the core of a sense of justice. This confirms the suggestion that 
disequilibrium between the individual and the social order can result in 
a positive ego-identity. While a sense of autonomy in Piagetian terms 
implies a sense of justice, ego-strength does not necessarily imply the 
same. Erikson (1965) conceives of autonomy as being rooted in "law and 
order" (p. 246); this idea was not confirmed by the present investigation.
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The classic Piagetian peer group cooperation is evident in the develop­
ment of the positive identities of black children. Theoretically, a 
logical extension of peer group cooperation is the development of a 
sense of justice. Yet the other-race favourableness of black children 
was not significantly different to that of white children. On an 
empirical level it is possible that both groups of children are inex­
tricably enmeshed in the social values of their society, with white 
children reinforcing the attitudes of the dominant group, and black 
children merely responding to the physical reality of their position 
as the oppressed majority. Both groups of children for example, chose 
as a poor child (economically poor) a black child - and this is not 
indicative of a racial attitude bu*- rather of a social reality.
Where children were able to separate racial from personal choices 
was to a certain extent in the Clark Doll Test : white males tended to 
prefer the black doll over and above the white doll, while black males 
chose the white doll. Although this difference was not significant, 
it does indicate the somewhat arbitrary nature of doll choices made by 
males when forced to identify with a female doll. Black and white 
females both tended to choose the white doll - this indicates a racial 
choice ou the part of both groups, white females preferred their own- 
race doll while black females preferred the other-race doll. The 
fact that black children responded to the white doll as having a nice 
colour shows the extent to which racial stereotypes are perpetuated; 
at a young age black children judge the white doll as "nice" and the 
black doll as "naughty". White children chose fairly evenly between 
black and white dolls. This indicates either a non-racial choice in 
preference for one particular doll, or an attempt to choose fairly 
between both races. Many of the white children came from professional 
backgrounds and could have been more exposed to liberal ideology than
the average South African child. The fact that one group, the black 
control group, scored an initial high other-race favourableness score 
of 13.40, which, after a two month time-span increased to 15.20, points 
to a possible development of justice from peer group cooperation.
This group actually obtained the lowest ego-identity mean and confirms 
the significant negative correlation found between racial attitudes and 
ego-identity. Certainly at the age of eight, a secure ego-identity 
does not go hand in hand with other-race favourableness.
The stress Kohlberg and Gillian (1971) place on the effect of 
social forces on stages of moral thought is the direction in which 
the results of this study can be interpreted. The study confirms the 
fact that an historical approach its embedded in much child psychology 
for an examination of social forces can elucidate the development of any 
particular cognitive and affective stage. Erikson'd theory of negative 
identities arose in fact from his study of the historical emergence of 
the psycho-social identity of American Negroes, and Erikson could have 
foreseen the impact of black consciousness on ego-identity development 
when he postulated the growth of positive identities out of a collective 
negative identity. Just as children incorporate past identifications 
in their future ego-identity, so too do historical identities converge 
in the formation of a new self-consciousness. Milner (1975) sees 
feelings of inferiority as basic to the personality of the black 
American; it is possible that historical circumstances have already 
changed such a conception. Jahoda (1961) found inferiority to be 
intrinsic to Ghanaians identification of themselves before in­
dependence - a post-independence study night produce contrasting 
results. It can be seen that a multi-racial media programme alone would 
not be sufficient to change attitudes and identities which have an 
historical root.
The results of this study confirm the need for a theoretical back­
ground to empirical race attitudes research : Erikson's theory of ego- 
identity, and its relation to Piaget and Kohlb^rg's theories of moral 
development provide a developmental basis for the study of racial 
attitudes in children. An empirical correlation between racial 
attitudes and ego-identity was significant, but in terms of an inverse 
relationship to that suggested by theoretical studies. This study 
suggested a theoretical concordance between race attitudes, ego-idcnt- 
ity and moral development, and the findings support such a conclusion, 
taking other-race favourableness as an indication of moral judgement.
The findings do suggest that race attitude research must take into 
account the historical and social background of the social system in 
which such research takes place; for example the South African context 
comprises an inverted situation where the majority has minority status 
and will obviously hold negative attitudes towards the dominant min­
ority. Given the historical basis of child development, Erikson's 
theory of ego-identity offers a theoretical link between changing social 
orders and the developing child - this is a link Erikson (1965, 1968) 
himself proffers. It is also suggested by theorists of moral de­
velopment (Piaget, Kohlberg) who cannot ignore the moral social order 
„n which the child develops.
9.3. Methodological Criticisms
The chief methodological criticism centres around the tenuous 
relationship between the measurement of self-concept and Erikson's ego- 
identity theory. In this study ego-identity was operationalized into 
self-concept due to the paucity of tools to measure what Erikson de­
fined as ego-idertity. Ego-identity is a developmental stage concept 
that should be operationalized in terms of Erikson's eight stages of 
man, and the resolution of the crises of each stage. The self-concept 
test in this study was the "Where are you Game" (Engel and Raine, 1963)
and this concentrates on the child's feelings of worth. The fact that 
a child feels "happy" does not necessarily mean that the child has re­
solved a certain stage, although feelings of inferiority were tapped by 
the self-concept test.
In terms of self-identity, the Clark Doll Test, which was used in 
this study as a test of racial attitudes, is perhaps a more stable 
measure of Erikson's theoretical construct. The Colcuring-In test 
(Clark and Clark, 1940) which produced individually interesting results 
did not yield sufficient information to affect the ego-identity score : 
this was possibly due to the E 's own classification of pictures in terms 
of only five categories. Subjective evaluations of coiouring-in re­
vealed many internal dynamics suggested by Erikson's theory of ego- 
identity : for example one white child who was obviously aware of the 
implications of the study coloured in the second girl (any colour could 
be chosen), brown, and said "I want to be untidy". She was possibly 
able to perceive the plight of being black in South Africa and wanted 
..u express some form of identification with black children without 
wanting to be black. Several black children chose the white crayon and 
t.vleured in the second child white, expressing a desire to identify with 
white children. On the other hand many black children seemed to be 
overwhelmed by the range of colour choice and appeared to use a wider 
range of colours than white subjects.
The Colouring-In test also involved the correct identification of 
three objects - one of which was a pig. White children responded in 
terms of the cultural stereotype of a pig as pink, while black children 
responded in terms of their reality. Many had never seen a pig and 
coloured the picture any colour they happened to like. The final ego- 
identity score did not tap the very complex reactions children actually 
gave to the Colouring-In test and the Clark Doll Test. These reactions
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increase the likelihood of a relationship between ego-identity and racial 
attitudes even though overall statistical results indicate a n e g a t i v e  
correlation. Mere complex measurement tools might produce more complex 
results in terms of Erikson's theory of ego-identity.
Although tests in this study have been used extensively all over the 
world, no validity or reliability data exists, probably because of the 
flexibility of the content of tests. It is possible that the Clark Doll 
Test should allow children an open-ended choice such as suggested by 
Lerner and Buehrig (1975). At the same time the repetitive nature of 
the battery of tests could result in progressively consistent responses 
of subjects in terms of boredom with the experiment.. Recordings of 
children's verbal expressions during testing suggest that an open-ended 
interview on racial situations might elicit more about the children's 
racial attitudes than a series of tests. Children were encouraged to 
talk about their choices which often indicated complex racial attitudes 
not revealed in their actual choice. It seems likely that one might ask, 
together with Katz and Zalk (1974) whether doll preferences are in fact 
an index of racial attitudes. Open ended interviews based on pictorial 
or real-life situations would possibly serve as a better measure of 
racial attitudei.
Another methodological weakness is the high possibility of exper­
imenter effect. Both races were tested by same-race experimenters in 
order Lo eliminate a confounding racial factor. Nevertheless, subjects 
were curious as to the nature of the study, and attempted to elicit 
"correct responses" from both experimenters. This suggests an awareness 
on the part of subjects as to the possibility of giving an "incorrect" 
response in terms of the experimenters' own racial attitudes.
An important methodological downfall lies in the great socio-economic 
differences in subject's backgrounds. From the outset, their intervention
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programme had to contend with the fact that however much multi-racial
contact such a programme portrays, children go home from school to their 
segregated and very different home environments. For white children 
education is a foregone conclusion, for black children it is only a 
possibility. Thus in the South African context sample selection in a 
multi-racial study i ; automatically biased. In this study white 
subjects came from mainly professional and managerial backgrounds while 
black subjects were children of unskilled or skilled workers. The £  
should have attempted to arrange contact between blazk and white children 
as a preliminary or prelude to the intervention programme. Milner 
(1972) conducted an action research project on five to nine yiar old 
children and examined the effect of black teachers as well as multi- 
iacial curricula on the racial attitudes of black and white children.
The premise of the year long programme was to create in white children
This is the ideal of multi-racial education in its entirety. Milner 
(1975) found early changes in the attitudes of children after prolonged 
intervention programmes.
9.4. Design
The results of the study suggest that the design used in this inves­
tigation, Solomon's design, mi gut be particularly neccessavy for a short 
pre- posttest time-span. The intention of the design is to elucidate 
whether any significant posttest -esults are due to pretesting and not 
the intervention programme. No pretest effect was found, hut given 
only a short two month intervention between pre- and posttesting, it is 
possible for pretest results to have a significant influence on posttest
"the formation of aclose relationship with 
a black person position of respect and
affection will affect the formation of their 
attitudes towards black people in genei.il, and 
the black teachers will help to foster a secure 
sensa of identity in their black children" 
(Milner; 1975, p. 249).
results (Solomon, 1949). The inclusion of a control group increases 
the possibility of distinguishing betweei a treatment effect and a pre­
test effect. In this particular study, Solomon's design necessitated 
the use of a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) as the design 
created three ir ependent variables. Multivariate analyses of variance 
are becoming increasingly popular in the social sciences, particularly 
with respect to pre- and posttest designs (Olson, 1976; Hummel and 
Sligo, 1971; Forman, 1978) and Solomon's design, particularly where 
two experimental groups exist, lends itself to such an analysis.
9.5. Suggestions for further research
The present study should be viewed as an impetus for future research: 
a two-month multi-racial media programme was found to be ineffective in 
changing children's racial attitudes, but extensive research poss bilitie 
a^e suggested by the theoretical and empirical issues discussed in the 
study.
There is a need for a thorough investigation into the tests used to 
measure racial attitudes especially in South Africa, and for the con­
struction of an operational Eriksonian ego-identity measure. The con­
struction of such a tool will enable experimenters to investigate the 
second important theoretical factor suggested by this study, namely the 
relationship between racial attitudes, ego-identity and moral develop­
ment. Kohlberg (1972) has constructed several reliable moral develop­
ment tests which he has used extensively to examine the development of 
moral judgement. If in fact ego-identity per sc could be measured, 
the theoretical link between Erikson's ego psychology and the cognitive- 
based theories of Kohlberg and Piaget could be investigated. This could 
lead to an enrichment in race attitude research by providing a theoreti­
cal explanation for the moral and social basis of the development of 
ego-identity and racial attitudes.
This study lacked an investigation into moral development which could 
have provided the key to Erikson's belief in the moral basis of identity 
development, and hence of racial attitudes. Kohlberg's theory suggests 
that children will probably express attitudes that accord with sanctioned 
racial stereotypes, thus research on racial attitudes and moral develop­
ment should perhaps concentrate on the adolescent who is at the 
Eriksonian stage of role confusion versus identity. Such a study could 
investigate the hypothesis tl at racial attitudes are a function of 
identity development. Tf the adolescent in a prejudiced society rejects 
the social order, is this a function of his ego-strength? Similarly, 
in South Africa today, what are the psychological consequences for an 
adolescent who makes such a choice yet is rejected by his society? Does 
the black adolescent who rejects the social order have more support for 
this identity crisis than the white adolescent?
The present investigation was concerned with younger children, and 
the potential for action research lies with just such a group. While 
a two-month intervention period was inadequate, most year-long inter­
vention programmes have changed young children's attitudes (Milner,
1 7r»), Many of these studies have taken place in societies which 
permit equality between races and this might have accounted for their 
effectiveness. In South Africa, future research must concentrate on 
alternatives to the present education system and the possible effects 
of changes on young children given existing racial attitudes. A recent 
report published by the Education Commission of the South African 
Institute of Race Relations (Education for a new era) suggests that in 
education "there should be as little separation of ethnic and language 
groups as possible" (Education Commission; 1979, p. 4) and by concen­
trating on means of achieving multi-cultural education, the research will 
be aiding attempts to change the society that has produced racial atti-
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tudes. To this end, the racial attitudes of parents and children 
should be studied together, for Trager and Yarrow (1952) found that 
children did not always express similar attitudes to their parents. In
addition, investigations of group-belongingness could help elucidate the 
extent of resistance to educational programmes designed to create 
multi-racial contact.
The present study confirmed theoretically and empirically the need 
for an investigation of the soc'al forces responsible for the develop - 
raent of the child's ego-identity, racial attitudes and moral judgement. 
Tl.o dynamics of the child's interaction with his environment can bs 
assessed in terms of the child's personal social and emotional c.’ing 
mechanisms, and the social and normative pressures to which h< is 
subjected. To this end further research should include an historical 
investigation of those forces responsible for the environment with 
which the child interacts in the present.
This study also confirmed the importance of psychology's role in 
race relations research. By utilizing social, educational and child 
development theories, the research psychologist is able to employ a 
broad and comprehensive perspective in the investigation of what is 
itself a multi-dimensional concept, racial prejudice. In Couth Africa 
such prejudice might be related to the social system to a much greater 
extent than in countries where racial equality exists. For example an 
authoritarian upbringing might not be a causal factor of racial pre­
judice in South Africa (Pettigrew, 195b) while it might play an im­
portant part in explaining the prejudice of individuals in other environ­
ments. Such differences highlight, the need for an underlying historical 
perspective in all race attitudes research. The psychologist is able 
to play his part in change by analyzing and constructing material for 
use in multi-racial programmes, and by evaluating the efficacy of such
material. At the same time by encouraging multi-racial contact amongst 
children the psychologist can attempt to envisage some of the immediate 
problems caused by educational desegregation.
This investigation was limited to black Zulu and Sotho-speaking, and 
to white English-speaking, children. It is essential that all sectors 
of the population be studied at an early stage to effectively assess the 
effect of apartheid on urban and rural Blacks as well as English and 
Afrikaans-speaking children. Such research will help alleviate the 
many generalizations made possible by research on a limited number of 
subjects. Should race attitude research multiply, there might indeed 
be sufficient interrelated studies to support calls for educational 
reform as one of the means of alleviating racial inequality in South 
Africa.
9.6. Conclusion
The overall aim of this study was to examine the racial attitudes 
and ego-identity of black and white children and to see whether a multi­
racial media programme could change suc.i attitudes. The study also 
attempted to provide a theoretical framework for the study of racial 
attitudes by examining Erikson'~ theory of ego-identity. This theory 
provided the stimulus for investigating ego-identity in conjunction with 
racial attitudes; similarly the moral basis of Erikson's conception of 
ago-identity prompted a discussion of Piaget and Kohlberg's cognitive 
based theories of moral development. The study took cognizance of the 
segregated structure of South African society in which there is no racial 
equality. In view of the failure of the intervention programme to 
change racial attitudes, and the fact that no difference was found 
between the ego-identity of black and white children, the following 
tentative conclusions can be drawn:-
1. Racial attitudes do exist in children of seven and a half years of
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age. A two month intervention programme is too short to register a 
change in such attitudes; however a longer, more concentrated programme 
which includes multi-racial contact between black and white children 
might be more effective.
2. the - lationship between racial attitudes and ego-identity was
foi to be significant : such a link was investigated in order to pro­
vide a developmental basis for race attitude research. The difference 
between the self-concept measure used in this study and Erikson1s ego- 
identity construct could account for the significant negative corre­
lation between the two variables.
3. It is suggested that Eriksonrs theory of ego-identity retains its 
importance for tace attitude research. The theory accounts for the 
emergence of positive identities out of the collective negative identity 
of an oppressed ^.roup such as South African Blacks. The theory is 
criticized for it. justification of the status quo as essential for the 
development of a positive ego-identity.
4. The theories of Kohlberg and Piaget identify the developmental 
stages of morality which could account for children's racial attitudes. 
Children respond to racial stereotypes which are sanctioned by the 
significant others in their environment. In addition peer group co-o 
peration cannot lead to a sense of justice in a society of constraint.
5. While pretesting did not have a significant effect on posttest 
racial attitude and ego-identity scores, it can be concluded that 
Solomon's design would be especially valuable where a long term inter­
vention programme is used. This design enables the experimenter to 
assess the effect on children of developmental maturniion and contempor­
aneous effects during the time-span of the programme.
It is suggested that future research concentrate on investigating 
the theoretical basis of race attitude development by focusing on
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the theories of Erikson, Piaget and Kohlberg, within an historical- 
social perspective. Studies of the relationship between ego-identity 
and morality in the adolescent could help to further understanding of 
the development of racial attitudes. This ctudy investigated a very 
small sample of the South African population and it is suggested that 
future studies select a wider cross-section of urban and rural, English 
and Afrikaans speaking children. The most important task of future 
psychological research is the creation and assessment of material to 
be used in multi-racial education. In this way the researcher can 
predict the possible problems created by a desegregated educational 
system in South Africa.
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: Engel and Raine s Self—concept test
I. (intellectually gifted^
(lacking this)
2. (happy)
(unhappy
(popular)
(unpopular)
(brave)
(frightened)
(attractive)
(unattractive)
(strong)
(weak)
7. (obedient)
(disobedient)
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Books
AUTHOR 
ullroy, B.
Kyter, E.
Mackay, D. et al. 
Keats, E.J.
Bonsai, C.
Crompton, M. 
Wolcutt, P.
Vaughan, J zed.) 
Usborne, P.
Beim, L. & J.
Weil, L.
Aluhea
APPENDIX 2 
used in multi-racial media 
TITLE
Bubu's street 
Who are we?
Dressing up 
Pet show
The case of the Hungry 
Stranger 
The house where Jack lives 
Super Sam and the Salad 
Garden 
Having a party 
In the park 
Two is a team
Fat Ernest
David and his sister 
Caro1
programme 
PUBLISHER 
Macmillan Educ. 
Burke Books 
Longman 
Puffin Books 
World's work
Children's Book 
Bodley Head 
Addison-’ esley
Macdonald & Co. 
Macdonald & Co. 
Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich 
Parents' Magazine 
Press 
Dinosaur pub.
Sources of multi-racial material and information 
concerning education in South Africa.
South African Institute of Race Relations Library.
Auden House, 68, Dc Korte Street, "hraamfontein, Johannesburg.
U.S. Information Service (Library and Film Centre)
Shakespeare House, Commissioner Street, Johannesburg.
Gubbins Library, University of the Witwatersrand.
1 Jan Smuts Avenue, Braamfontein. Johannesburg
DATE
1975 
197? 
1970 
1974
1977
1978
1976
1973
1972
1973
1973
1976
Human Awareness Programme
RPC House, De Beer Street, Braamfontein, Johannesburg.
Institute of Social Economic Research 
Rhodes University, Grahamstown. South Africa.
African Studies Institute
University of the Witwatersrand, 1 Jan Smuts Avenue, Braamfontein, 
Johannesburg.
Ravan Press
105, Corlett Place, Braamfontein, Johannesburg.
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APPENDIX 3
Race A t t i t u d e s  S c o r i n g  Sheet 
Name: School:
I. "Show me" test
Score
I.
2 .
3 .
4.
5 .
6.
7 .
8.
Total:
2. "Categories" test
Race v. Sex Score Race v. Age
1. I.
2 . 2 .
3. 3.
4. 4.
T o t a l :________  Total:
Overa .«!:____
3. Clark Doll Test
B Score
1.
2.
3.
4 .
5.
Total:
Comments:
Score
Total Race Attitudes Score:
Author  De Saxe M  
Name of thesis Changes in racial attitudes and ego-identity after a multi-racial media programm  1979 
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